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Fundamental Property Rights
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.*

[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.'
In the last decade, the Supreme Court's Takings Clause 2 jurisprudence has

experienced something of a renaissance.

In a series of cases, the Supreme

Court has significantly broadened the scope of the Takings Clause, particularly
with respect to so-called "regulatory" takings.4 This trend is consistent with the
writings of a number of scholars who have argued that property rights should be

deemed no less important than liberty rights.5 There nonetheless remains a
significant area of contemporary constitutional law in which property interests
have not enjoyed equal treatment with liberty interests-an area in which
property rights have been relegated to the role of a "poor relation."
The Supreme Court's modem substantive due process jurisprudence, which
protects "fundamental" liberty interests from governmental abridgment absent
a "compelling" governmental interest, 6 has never been formally extended to

encompass "fundamental" property rights.7 One could posit a number of rea* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University, Indianapolis; J.D., LL.M., Duke University School
of Law. With thanks to Professors William Van Alstyne, James W. Torke, and David V. Snyder, who
provided invaluable insight into the problems associated with this article. Thanks also to Nancy M.
Olson, E. Gary Spitko, and John C. Hueston, who provided extremely useful comments on earlier drafts
of this article. I also wish to acknowledge the support of an Indiana University summer research grant,
which helped to facilitate my work on this project. The usual disclaimer applies: any and all errors and
omissions are my own.
1. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. The Supreme Court has put the matter quite plainly:
We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill
of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of
a poor relation in these comparable circumstances.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
4. See id. at 391-92; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
5. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 3-9, 133-34 (1992); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 25-30 (1985); 3 FRIEDRICH
A. HAYEK, The Political Order of a Free People, in LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 98, 110-11 (1977);
Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 725-30
(1984); Carol M. Rose, Propertyas the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1996).
But cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-5, at 603 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that
the contemporary Supreme Court's protection of property rights under the Takings Clause "borders on
fetishism").
6. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
163 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
7. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985) (assuming for the sake of
decision the existence of a property interest in being a medical student and suggesting that arbitrary or
irrational abridgment of that property interest by the state would violate substantive due process);
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sons for this state of affairs. The most obvious explanation would be that
property rights are simply less important than liberty interests and therefore are
never "fundamental." ' 8 However, the Supreme Court has never suggested that
this is so, and, if it were, the Court's most recent Takings Clause decisions
would not make overall doctrinal sense. 9
Another explanation would be that the constitutional provisions that specifically protect property interests, such as the Takings and Contracts Clauses,
provide comprehensive protection of all property interests. But this is not the
case.' For example, neither the Takings Clause nor the Contracts Clause
protects against tort reform legislation that limits compensatory damages, because such legislation affects property interests only prospectively. Nevertheless, plaintiffs with tort claims arising after the effective date of such legislation
have lost the ability to recover fully for injuries to often important-sometimes
"fundamental"-property interests."i Thus, substantive due process protection
for property interests is far from superfluous, notwithstanding the existence of
other preexisting rights (such as those conferred by the Takings2 and Contracts
Clauses) that protect property interests in limited circumstances. 1
Indeed, substantive due process protections should reach property interests. If
economic rights are not "poor relations" of civil liberties, why should substantive due process protect the latter and not the former? Furthermore, some
13
property interests are plainly "fundamental": a person's interest in bodily integrity

Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979) (per curiam) (holding that in the absence
of a fundamental property or liberty interest, a state need only act rationally to satisfy the requirements
of substantive due process); cf. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398,
1410-14 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that substantive due process protects property interests, whether or not
"fundamental," from arbitrary government action), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
8. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
property rights-unlike liberty interests-are fungible, and therefore postdeprivation process is sufficient to meet the requirements of procedural due process); cf.Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329,
336-39 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument that liberty interests are inherently less commensurable
as a class than property interests).
9. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388-96 (1994) (holding that zoning and planning
restrictions on landowner's development of commercial property constitute a taking); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020-31 (1992) (holding that state law prohibiting development of shoreline real estate may constitute a taking).
10. See infra notes 328-34 and accompanying text.
11. See JAMES MADISON, Property, NAT'L GAzErrE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 266, 266-68 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
12. Cf.Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that when a specific constitutional
right provides an avenue of relief, the federal courts need not provide additional substantive due
process protection for that interest).
13. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26, 29-31, 37-39 (1905); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch.
Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994); Moore v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503-09 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 793 P.2d 479 (1990); cf.United States
v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1387-89 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (rejecting the proposition that substantive due
process protects a citizen's bodily integrity from sexual assaults by state actors), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 2522 (1996).
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or in her reputation' 4 seems no less important or compelling than her interest in
freedom of speech. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has accorded strong protection to even the most marginal forms of social protest while refusing to afford
more than minimal constitutional protection to reputation.' 5 Under existing law,
substantive due process fully protects a citizen's liberty interest in engaging in
political expression but affords substantially less protection to her property
interest in reputation or bodily integrity. 16
Judicial protection of property rights under the doctrine of substantive due
process should not differ in kind or scope from the protection of liberty
interests. The outcome of a particular case should not be predetermined simply
because property, rather than liberty, is at issue in a particular case. 17 Both
interests, together with "life," appear in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments; they enjoy equal dignity as a textual 8matter and
therefore also deserve equal dignity in the scope of their application.'
At present, the status of fundamental property rights is an open question. Most
federal courts have recognized that government may not arbitrarily or irrationally
abridge a nonfundamental property interest; 9 however, whether fundamental property
interests qualify for a higher degree of substantive due process protection is unclear.

14. As the Bard from Avon explained almost 400 years ago:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act 3, sc. 3, lines 155-61 (A.L. Rowse ed., 1978).
15. Compare Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-35 (1991) (refusing to recognize a constitutionally
protected interest in reputation) and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976) (same) with Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-17 (1989) (holding that the First Amendment protects flag burning) and
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment precluded California
state authorities from prosecuting Mr. Cohen for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck
the Draft" in a public courthouse). Of course, the Supreme Court's protection of fringe speech activities
serves larger free speech values. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential" Cases and Larger Principles, 74 Tx. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1996). Nevertheless, it seems
self-evident that a citizen's interest in her property rights may be of a higher order than her interest in
civil liberties. See Alex Kozinski, Foreword,in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY xi, xvii (James
A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
16. See, e.g., Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233-35; Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1387-89.
17. This is certainly true in the area of procedural due process. Once the existence of a property or
liberty fight is established, the process rights that the state must respect are generally not a function of
whether property or liberty is at issue. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). But cf Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701-03 (1977) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that property interests deserve less procedural protection than liberty interests).
18. See infra Part ID; see also William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative
Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 453 (1977) (arguing that courts
should afford property interests equal treatment with liberty interests for purposes of applying the Due
Process Clause).
19. See infra Parts Ic2-5.
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In the modem era, 20 the Supreme Court has not addressed whether "fundamental" property rights even exist. However, a growing number of lower federal
courts have taken up this issue, with widely varying results.2 ' In addition, at
least one Supreme Court Justice has suggested in a concurring opinion that if
substantive due process protects property rights at all, it should only protect
22
some property rights-those that could reasonably be deemed "fundamental.",
Significantly, the Supreme Court has-albeit not recently-spoken to the
issue of "fundamental" property rights as an aspect of its substantive due
process jurisprudence. In Truax v. Corrigan2 3 in 1921, it held that the states
have an affirmative obligation to recognize and protect certain "fundamental"
property interests from abridgment. 24 The Court has cited Truax favorably twice
in the intervening seven decades, 25 but has never spoken directly to the continu-

20. By this I mean the post-New Deal or the "post-Lochner" era. Substantive due process made its
big comeback almost 30 years ago in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (plurality opinion),
a case in which the Supreme Court held that citizens enjoy a "fundamental" liberty interest in deciding
whether to beget children. The plurality opinion relied on two Lochner-era cases, Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), to support its reasoning that
a free-standing and textually nebulous right of privacy exists under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Ronald J.Krotoszynski, Jr., Note, Autonomy, Community, and Traditions
of Liberty: The Contrastof British andAmerican Privacy Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1398, 1434-40 (arguing
that the Supreme Court's protection of privacy through traditions of liberty has given way to vindication of majoritarian moral choices).
In a larger sense, substantive due process never really left the scene. Since Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Supreme Court has not hesitated to rely upon the Due Process Clause
to "incorporate" discrete provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states. See David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil Rights and Liberties, 1930-1941, 1987 DuKE L.J. 800, 809-10;
see also Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?,92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 900-02 (1994) (describing the
Court's process of incorporating various provisions of the Bill of Rights). If one deems this "substantive" due process-and one would be hard pressed to characterize the rights at issue as implicating
"procedural" due process in any meaningful way-the Due Process Clause has served as a font of
"substantive" rights for the entire twentieth century. See generally Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
275-76 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (endorsing the use of substantive due process as the means of
incorporating certain provisions of the Bill of Rights against state governments); Zinermon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113, 125-28 (1990) (describing the process of incorporation).
21. Compare Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1409-10 (9th Cir.
1989) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' Takings Clause claim but holding that substantive due process
protects nonfundamental property interests), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) and Moore v. Warwick Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (same) with Local 342, Long Island Pub. Serv.
Employees v. Town Bd., 31 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that substantive due process
does not protect nonfundamental property rights) and Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir.
1990) (same).
22. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 228-30 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
23. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
24. Id. at 328-30. Of course, one could question whether the specific property interest at issue in
Truax-the ability to operate a restaurant free of labor picketers-really was "fundamental." See infra
notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
25. See NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16, 16-17 (1961) (per curiam); Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928).
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ing validity of Truax's central holding: that states do not enjoy unlimited
discretion to create or abolish property interests as they think best.
Regardless of how one views the wisdom of substantive due process as a
jurisprudential matter, 6 one must acknowledge that the contemporary Supreme
Court, much like its predecessors earlier this century, 27 is willing to limit the
states' freedom of action with respect to certain "fundamental" liberty interests.2 8 In light of this doctrinal commitment, I argue that the federal courts
cannot logically refuse to recognize the existence of "fundamental" property
rights. Fundamental property rights, no less than fundamental liberty rights,
merit judicial protection from federal or state legislation that would unduly
burden their enjoyment. Moreover, I posit that a number of property interests
should be deemed "fundamental" in light of their importance in contemporary
society and their long-standing recognition in Anglo-American law. 29 In addition, substantive due process should offer some modest protection to nonfundamental property interests. As with nonfundamental liberty interests, the
substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause should be construed to prohibit
utterly irrational or arbitrary state behavior that abridges or burdens any cognizable property interest.30
26. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 3-5 (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 28-32, 141-45 (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-72 (1980); Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1971); John Hart
Ely, On the Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 944 (1973).
27. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-58 (1905); see also Truax, 257 U.S. at 327-30.
28. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (demonstrating the current Supreme Court's
willingness to short-circuit majoritarian decisionmaking processes in order to safeguard higher-order
constitutional values even when such values are not enumerated in specific constitutional text).
Moreover, the Supreme Court seemingly has no intention of abandoning its fundamental liberty rights
jurisprudence anytime soon. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-75 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (holding that only regulations placing an undue burden on fundamental liberty rights violate
the Due Process Clause). Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, a conservative's conservative, has eaten of the
forbidden fruit of substantive due process. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
278 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (recognizing a fundamental right to make decisions concerning medical
treatment). The Supreme Court might once again-and arguably should---elevate fundamental liberty
interests over state law when it reviews Quill v. Vacco, 80 F3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
36 (1996), and Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996), both of which held that substantive due process
prohibits a state from criminalizing physician-assisted suicide (although Quill did so by coupling a
substantive due process right with the Equal Protection Clause). Such a holding in these cases would
represent a reasonable extension of Cruzan. But cf Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J.
1123, 1146 (1997) (arguing that physician-assisted suicide should not be deemed a "fundamental right"
and suggesting that even if the Supreme Court concludes that it is, the Court should nonetheless "reject
the constitutional challenge" because of "institutional reasons connected with the limited place of the
Supreme Court in American government").
29. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Reputation provides an excellent example
of such a property interest. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(recognizing that the right to one's reputation is "at root of any decent system of ordered liberty"); see
also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 283-84 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging the
constitutional importance of certain interests, including reputation, that have long been protected under
the common law).
30. See infra notes 406-38 and accompanying text.
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In Part I, this article considers whether property rights should be accorded
substantive due process protection by revisiting Truax and examining broadly
the federal courts' approach to according property rights substantive due process protection. Part II then applies the theory of substantive due process set
forth in Part I to reputation, which arguably constitutes a fundamental property
right. 3' Part III raises and responds to some of the difficulties that might arise
from the recognition of fundamental property rights, including the practical
difficulties associated with identifying such rights. Finally, in Part IV, this article
analyzes the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the scope of
substantive due process, which suggests that a majority of the Justices may be
prepared to broaden the scope of the doctrine significantly. I conclude that the
Supreme Court's current liberty-based substantive due process doctrine should
be extended to fully protect fundamental property rights and to protect nonfundamental property interests from utterly arbitrary or irrational government action.
I.

PROPERTY RIGHTS: TOWARD A COHERENT DOCTRINE

OF SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS

Despite a rich and well-developed jurisprudence interpreting the Takings
Clause, 32 plaintiffs who wish to assert that the deprivation of a particular
property interest violates substantive due process have had difficulty getting the
contemporary Supreme Court's attention. The Court's substantive due process

31. Ultimately, if one accepts the argument that some property interests are fundamental, the
particular designation of an interest as "property" or "liberty" will be far less important to selecting the
appropriate standard of judicial review than properly assessing the importance of the particular
interest-be it property or liberty. Current substantive due process doctrine requires that an interest be
deemed a "liberty" to trigger strict scrutiny review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court strains to expand
the concept of liberty to encompass virtually every important personal interest, even if the interest
could more logically be classed "property" based on its nature or history. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 714-23, 729-35 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing reputation as solely a liberty
interest); cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (holding that due process protects
reputation without specifying whether reputation constitutes a liberty or property interest). Bodily
integrity provides a good example of this phenomenon. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 846, 851-53, 857 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("The controlling word in the case before us is
liberty."); id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing a woman's
interest in bodily integrity as a "liberty" interest); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Every violation of a person's bodily integrity is
an invasion of his or her liberty."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (characterizing interest
in terminating a pregnancy as a "liberty" interest). Restrictions on one's movement constitute a liberty
interest, but a person's interest in her physical body is more akin to a property interest. Hence, one finds
workers' compensation schemes that set an economic value on the loss of a finger or a toe. See
generally Michelle B. Bray, Note, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in Human
Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REV. 209 (1990).
32. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 413 (1922).
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jurisprudence reflects an almost exclusive focus on fundamental liberty rights
and has largely ignored the existence of fundamental property interests.
It was not always so. At the same time that the Supreme Court was first
establishing its liberty/privacy jurisprudence as an aspect of substantive due
process, it also protected fundamental property interests from undue governmental burdens. In the case of Truax v. Corrigan,the Supreme Court held that states
had an obligation to recognize and protect certain "fundamental" property
interests.33 In order to sort out the current confusion regarding the scope of
substantive due process protection of property interests, one must go back to the
roots of substantive due process: the decisions of the White and (especially) Taft
34
Courts.

Having established a historical baseline, this Part will then proceed to examine the contemporary efforts of the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts
to fix the proper role (if any) of property in substantive due process analysis.
This exercise will establish that Truax represents a coherent theory of substantive due process even if the Truax Court's decision to apply the theory on the
facts presented in the case remains dubious.
A. BACK TO THE FUTURE?: TRUAX V. CORRIGAN

In Truax, a five-Justice majority held that an Arizona statute prohibiting the
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes violated the due process rights of a
restaurant owner named Truax. 35 The case easily represents the high-water mark
of substantive due process protection for property rights. Although Truax
presents a defensible theory of substantive due process, the facts of the case do
not warrant its application.
In April 1916, the unionized cooks and waiters working at Truax's restaurant
went on strike, complaining that the owners were not paying fair wages.
Incident to the strike, the employees picketed the restaurant, urging the general
public not to patronize the establishment. The strike was highly effective, and
the restaurant's receipts fell precipitously. In order to avoid further losses, Truax
attempted to obtain an injunction against the picketing. 36
Three years earlier, the Arizona legislature had adopted a statute, section
1464, that prohibited the Arizona state courts from issuing injunctions in labor
disputes "unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property or to a

33. Truax, 257 U.S. at 327-30.
34. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DuKE L.J. 65,
65-76 (describing the origins of due process protection in the shift between the White and Taft Courts);
see also David P Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv.504, 507-16 (1987); Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process,
1987 Wis. L. REv.265, 269-83.
35. Truax, 257 U.S. at 320.
36. Id. at 321-22.
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property right.", 37 The exception to the general prohibition was further qualified
by a requirement that "no [other] adequate remedy at law" be available to
at issue.3 8 Section 1464 also authorized peaceful
protect the property interest
39
picketing in labor disputes.
Truax claimed that the former employees not only picketed the restaurant and
libelled him, 40 but that they also threatened patrons and nonunion workers with
violence. 4 1 Based on these allegations, the Supreme Court concluded that even
"[v]iolence could not have been more effective" in destroying the restaurant's
viability.

42

Truax pressed two claims before the Supreme Court. First, he alleged that his
business constituted a property interest and that Arizona law had failed to
protect adequately that interest.4 3 Alternatively, he argued that section 1464
denied him and all other similarly situated persons equal protection of the laws
by withholding the injunctive relief that was otherwise available to citizens
seeking injunctions in nonlabor disputes. 44
The Supreme Court began its due process analysis by observing that "[p]laintiffs' business is a property right.", 45 Moreover, it explained that "[a] law which
operates to make lawful such a wrong as is described in plaintiffs' complaint
deprives the owner of the business and the premises of his property without due
process, and can not be held valid under the Fourteenth Amendment.", 46 In a
sweeping opinion, the majority went on to hold that Arizona had a constitutional obligation to protect Truax's property interest in his business. In this case,
the state could not constitutionally refuse injunctive relief to business owners in
labor disputes.47
37. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1464 (1913); see Truax, 257 U.S. at 322.
38. § 1464; Truax, 257 U.S. at 322.
39. See § 1464.
40. Truax, 257 U.S. at 321, 327-28.
41. Id. at 325-26.
42. Id. at 328.
43. Id. at 322.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 327 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 328.
47. Id. at 328-30. Indeed, the Court further required the state to protect such property interests from
private abridgment as well. Id.; see also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864, 876-78 (1986) (explaining, in the context of Truax, that the right to property
has little value without protection from third parties). The recognition of fundamental property rights
does not necessarily impose an open-ended affirmative duty on state governments to protect property
interests from private abridgment. Rather, Truax's requirement that the state provide adequate civil
remedies to protect fundamental property interests may be conceptualized as a negative right: the right
to be free from arbitrary or irrational limitations on the state's recognition of one's property interests.
Thus, one could think of the obligation to provide adequate legal redress as necessary to avoid a
violation of due process, just as courts order state governments to provide clean and safe prisons for
inmates and adequate patient care in state-run mental institutions. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318
(M.D. Ala. 1976), affid in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 E2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 & 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid sub nor. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Describing Truax's property right as "fundamental," the Court explained that
"the legislative power of a State can only be exerted in subordination to the
fundamental principles of right and justice which the guaranty of due process in
the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to preserve. '4 8 Depriving Truax of
injunctive relief in the context of his labor49dispute, the Court concluded, was
"wholly at variance with those principles.",
The Supreme Court then took up Truax's equal protection claim, finding that
it too had merit: "[T]he plaintiffs have been deprived of the equal protection of
the law.", 50 Although the Arizona legislature had discretion to create or extinguish particular kinds of judicial relief, it was not free to withhold a particular
category of judicial relief-here, injunctive relief-from a specific class of
plaintiffs (in this case, all parties embroiled in labor disputes). 5 ,
The Supreme Court's lack of deference to the Arizona legislature's decision
to establish a state public policy protecting Arizona workers' right to picket
could not have been more complete. Without a doubt, Truax v. Corrigan
embodies the worst excesses of the Lochner era. In his dissent, Justice Holmes
objected strongly to the majority's refusal to acquiesce in Arizona's entirely
reasonable policy choice. He explained that "[b]y calling a business 'property'
you make it seem like land, and lead up to the conclusion that a statute cannot
substantially cut down the advantages of ownership existing before the statute
was passed.", 52 Justice Holmes concluded by expressing his complete disdain
with the majority's meddling:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an important part of the community desires,
in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even though the
experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose
judgment I most respect.53
Another dissenter, Justice Pitney, conceded that it was "indisputable" "[t]hat
48. Truax, 257 U.S. at 329.
49. Id. at 330.
50. Id. at 334.
51. Id. at 334-42. In this respect, the reasoning of the Truax Court is strikingly similar to the
Supreme Court's reasoning in the recent case of Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1625 (1996) (noting
that "the [Colorado] amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection
from the injuries caused by discrimination"). Concluding that "[a] State cannot ...deem a class of
persons a stranger to its laws," the Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado
constitution that prohibited the adoption of laws or ordinances protecting the rights of gays and
lesbians. Id. at 1628-29. The crucial difference between Romer and Truax is the interest at stake and the
reasons proffered by Colorado and Arizona in defense of their respective enactments. Arizona offered
plausible arguments related to the inequality of bargaining power that existed between labor and
management, emphasizing that the use of injunctions in labor disputes had tended to perpetuate this
inequality. However, Colorado was unable to identify any plausible nondiscriminatory reasons that
supported the Colorado electorate's adoption of Amendment 2.
52. Truax, 257 U.S. at 342 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the right to conduct a lawful business, and thereby acquire pecuniary profits...
is property.", 54 Nonetheless, Truax had no reasonable expectation that the law
regulating the operation of his business would remain static: "[N]o person has a
vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to have it remain unaltered for
his benefit ...
Justice Pitney concluded that section 1464 did not deny
Truax either due process or the equal protection of the laws.
Justice Brandeis also authored a separate dissent in which he incorporated the
points made both by Justice Holmes and Justice Pitney. Like Justice Pitney, he
acknowledged that Truax had a property interest in his business, but he emphasized that "[t]he rules governing the contest necessarily change from time to
time."' 56 He proceeded to survey the myriad approaches that various states and
Great Britain had taken to regulating labor relations and concluded that Arizona's public policy was not arbitrary or capricious. 5 7
Truax demonstrates that the issue of substantive due process protection for
property interests is not a new problem. At the zenith of the Lochner era, the
Supreme Court recognized the existence of fundamental property interests and
acted to protect such interests from legislative encroachments.5 8 Moreover,
despite Lochner's demise, the various courts of appeals have, during the last
decade, issued a plethora of widely divergent opinions that consider extending
more than rational-basis substantive due process protection to private property
rights.59 As will be discussed more fully in Part Ic, these cases reflect broad
disagreement on rather basic questions, including whether substantive due
process protects property interests at all, whether it protects only fundamental
property interests, and whether it protects nonfundamental property interests.60
The confusion that exists both within and among the lower federal courts
provides compelling evidence of the need for the Supreme Court to address
directly the continuing validity of Truax's central premise: that substantive due
process protects property and liberty equally.
B. THE LEGACY OF TRUAX V. CORRIGAN

For a case of such sweeping breadth, Truax v. Corrigan'sjurisprudential
impact has proven ephemeral. 6 ' Even during the remaining years of the Lochner
54. Id. at 347 (Pitney, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 348 (Pitney, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 354-55 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 365-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 329-40.
59. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Love v.
Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1995); Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994);
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556-61 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898
(1995); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215-21 (6th Cir. 1992); Reich v. Beharry, 883
F.2d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1989); Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398,
1407-14 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Annendariz, 75 F.3d at 1326.
60. See infra notes 92-188 and accompanying text.
61. See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notesfor a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 491
n.39, 501 n.54, 503 n.55 (1962) (noting that although never formally repudiated, the federal courts have
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era-and notwithstanding a number of opportunities to do so-the Supreme
Court never found an appropriate occasion to apply Truax to protect a "fundamental" property right.
For example, in Adkins v. Children'sHospital,62 the Supreme Court reviewed
a challenge to a District of Columbia law that established a minimum wage for
women and children.6 3 An employer and a female employee brought suits
challenging the constitutionality of the legislation, arguing that the statute
64
violated their property and liberty rights protected by the Due Process Clause.
Although the Supreme Court decided the case on substantive due process
grounds, its due process analysis focused entirely on the employer and employee's liberty interest in freedom of contract rather than on the employer's
property interest in its business.65
Adkins was a classic reprise on Lochner; indeed, the Supreme Court even
cited Lochner in support of its decision to void the minimum wage law. 6 6 The
majority placed no reliance on Truax, even though the interest at issueemploying women and minors to work in businesses located within the District
of Columbia-could easily have been characterized as a "property" interest.
Moreover, Chief Justice Taft, the author of the majority opinion in Truax,
dissented in Adkins.6 7

Despite Adkins, Truax was not completely forgotten in the waning days of the
Lochner era. In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,6 8 the Supreme Court cited
Truax for the proposition that a business constituted a property interest.69 In
Baldridge, the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania statute that restricted the

never applied Truax's substantive due process holding in the modem era); see also Currie, supra note
34, at 71-76 (describing and analyzing Truax and its implications for both substantive due process and
the state action doctrine).
62. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
63. See 40 Stat. 960, ch. 174 (1918).
64. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 542-43.
65. Id. at 545-46.
66. Id. at 545.
67. In what at first seems to be a remarkable about-face, Chief Justice Taft argued that 'it is not the
function of this Court to hold congressional acts invalid simply because they are passed to carry out
economic views which the Court believes to be unwise or unsound." Id. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
However, the bulk of his dissent belies this sweeping assertion. Citing numerous precedents, Chief
Justice Taft noted that the Supreme Court had upheld laws regulating wages when the work being
regulated-for example, coal mining, smelting, heavy manufacturing-was particularly onerous or the
workers (specifically, women or children) were considered especially vulnerable. Id. at 563-66 (Taft,
C.J., dissenting). The law at issue in Adkins protected women from unfairly low wages and, accordingly, came within the category of constitutionally acceptable economic regulation. Id. at 566-67 (Taft,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Taft expressly reserved judgment on the larger question whether
Congress or the state legislatures could enact a minimum wage limitation "for adult men." id. at 566
(Taft, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Taft therefore could have squared his opinion in Truax with his
dissent in Adkins: the Arizona law at issue in Truax did not protect a specific and particularly vulnerable
segment of the work force, but rather constituted a generally applicable regulation of labor relations.
68. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
69. Id. at 111.
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ownership of pharmacies to registered pharmacists. 70 The Court did not describe the Liggett Company's interest as "fundamental," but nevertheless gave
the Pennsylvania statute very little deference, essentially engaging in de novo
review of the wisdom of the Pennsylvania law and applying strict scrutiny to
Pennsylvania's justifications for enacting the statute. 7 ' The Baldridge Court
observed that "unless justified as a valid exercise of the police power, the act
assailed must be declared unconstitutional because the enforcement thereof will
deprive appellant of its property without due process of law."' 72 Without resting
its holding on Truax, the Baldridge Court nonetheless used substantive due
process in a fashion consistent with Truax's reasoning to protect a property
interest.
Scarcely more than a decade later, in Fashion Originators'Guild of America
v. Federal Trade Commission,73 the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to an
enforcement action filed against the guild for unfair trade practices. The guild
attempted to enforce de facto copyright and trademark rights against competitors who made and sold apparel similar to the guild members' designs-a
practice that the guild denominated "style piracy."' 74 The Supreme Court
rejected the guild's challenge, concluding that the guild's practices "constituted
an unfair method of competition.", 75 The unanimous decision did not even
consider whether the guild members had a "fundamental" property interest in
their businesses or whether such an interest precluded the federal government
from prohibiting their activities.7 6
Thus, Truax-like most of the other decisions of the Lochner era-had
simply disappeared from the Supreme Court's repertoire by the early 1940s.
Unlike some vestiges of the Lochner period,7 7 however, Truax did not reappear
in the 1960s. 78 Indeed, over the last seventy-five years, the lower federal courts
70. Id. at 113-14.
71. Id. at 110-14.
72. Id. at 111.
73. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
74. Id. at 460-62.
75. Id. at 464.
76. See id. at 464-68.
77. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-99 (1923), involved a challenge to a state statute that
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages in private or parochial schools. The Supreme Court struck
down the statute, finding that it violated a fundamental liberty interest in child rearing. Id. at 399-400.
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court struck down a state law that
required all children to attend public schools. Id. at 530-32. Employing reasoning virtually identical to
its reasoning in Meyer, the Court held that it was "entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." Id. at 534-35. Although both Pierce and Meyer relied on Truax to support their
holdings, see Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535-36; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, neither decision includes specific
reliance on Truax's analysis of fundamental property rights. Both Meyer and Pierce are "fundamental
liberty interest" cases.
78. Although the Supreme Court cited Truax in 1961 for the proposition that a district court could
retain jurisdiction over a case until an ongoing state court action concluded, this use of the case hardly
reestablished its broader precedential authority. NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16, 17 (1961) (per
curiam); cf Henkin, supra note 61, at 491 n.39 (suggesting that Gallion might represent a resurrection
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also have failed to make much use of Truax. No lower federal court has ever
directly enforced Truax's holding that the substantive aspect of the Due Process
Clause limits the states' ability to enact legislation that adversely affects "fundamental" property interests. 9
C. CONTEMPORARY TREATMENT OF PROPERTY INTERESTS
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Despite the disappearance of Truax, the Supreme Court and several federal
courts of appeals have addressed the existence of substantive due process claims
for deprivations of property rights in the post-Lochner era, with widely varying
results.
1. The Supreme Court, Property, and Substantive Due Process
In Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,8 ° the Supreme Court
assumed for the sake of decision that a medical student possessed a cognizable
property interest in his status as a medical student and could therefore raise a
substantive due process challenge to his expulsion from medical school. 8 ' The
Court did not, however, hold that such a claim was viable in this case, nor did it
recognize a generalized right to substantive due process protection for property
interests. 2
Concurring in the result, Justice Powell wrote separately to emphasize that in
his view, a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a property interest
existed only if the interest at issue bore some "resemblance to the fundamental
interests that previously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the
of Truax as a viable precedent in the post-Lochner era). History teaches that contrary to Professor
Henkin's suggestion of an oblique endorsement of substantive due process, when the Supreme Court
finally decided to resurrect strong substantive due process protection for selected liberty interests, it did
so boldly, directly, and without apology. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (rejuvenating the Lochner-era precedents of Meyer and Pierce); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 1435-37
(describing the Supreme Court's resuscitation of substantive due process in the field of personal
liberties).
79. The closest that any lower federal court ever came to such a holding was in 1931, when a
three-judge panel relied on Truax's holding to conclude that a business constituted a property interest.
See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lee, 49 F.2d 274, 279 (D. Or. 1931). However, the court did not rely
on Truax's substantive due process holding. Similarly, in 1970 a Ninth Circuit panel cited Truax (in
dicta) for the proposition that the Due Process Clause "sets limits on the power of Congress
retroactively to deprive [citizens] of vested property, innocently acquired." United States v. Perry, 431
F.2d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 1970); cf Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (arguing that "the use of substantive due process to extend constitutional protection to economic
and property rights has been largely discredited"). None of these cases, however, represents an
application of Truax's broader substantive due process holding. One possible explanation may be
Truax's overt suggestion that substantive due process encompasses affirmative rights of a (very)
generalized nature against the state. As Professor David Currie has observed, this proposition runs
deeply against the grain of American constitutional jurisprudence. See Currie, supra note 47, at 876-78,
886-90.
80. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
81. Id. at 222-23.
82. Id.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:555

Constitution.", 83 In Justice Powell's view, Ewing's interest in continued enrollment in the medical school did not constitute a "fundamental" property interest
and therefore enjoyed no substantive due process protection. 84
In a similar case, Harrah Independent School District v. Martin,85 a schoolteacher claimed that the school board's refusal to renew her contract violated
her substantive due process rights by arbitrarily taking her property interest in
continued employment.8 6 The Board maintained that Martin had failed to
comply with the school district's continuing education requirements and that
nonrenewal of Martin's contract was a permissible sanction. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had held that the school district's decision not to
renew Martin's contract constituted an arbitrary action that 87"offended 'notions
of fairness' generally embodied in the Due Process Clause.",
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that Martin's
interest in continued employment was not "anything resembling the individual's freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation,
marriage, and family life.", 88 In the absence of such an interest-a "fundamental" interest, if you will-the school district merely had to act rationally.89 Not
surprisingly, the Court concluded that the school district's decision met this
minimal obligation. 90
Despite the seeming clarity of Ewing and Martin, the lower federal courts
have had great difficulty creating and applying an analytical framework for
evaluating substantive due process claims involving property rights. 91 The
federal courts of appeals have split on the basic question whether substantive
due process protects property rights at all; some have held that it protects only
fundamental property rights, while others have permitted plaintiffs to bring
substantive due process claims regardless of the nature of the property interest
at issue.
2. The Ninth Circuit's Pathbreaking Approach (and Subsequent Retreat)
At one extreme, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has broadly
endorsed the use of substantive due process to protect property interests from
83. Id. at 229-30 (Powell, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 230 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. 440 U.S. 194 (1979) (per curiam).
86. Id. at 194-95.
87. Id. at 198; see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
substantive due process protects citizens from arbitrary government action and that the scope of this
protection should be directly related to the importance of the interest at issue).
88. Martin, 440 U.S. at 198 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
89. See id. at 198-99.
90. Id. at 199-201.
91. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process,JudicialReview, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 313, 328-29 (1993) (observing that the role of federal law in
limiting state-defined property interests "remains unclear"). See generally Craig W. Hillwig, Comment,
Giving PropertyAll the Process That's Due: A "Fundamental" MisunderstandingAbout Due Process,
41 CATH. U. L. REv. 703 (1992).
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arbitrary or unreasonable government action. In Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v.
City of Simi Valley, 9 2 the Ninth Circuit held that "the due process clause

includes a substantive component which guards against arbitrary and capricious
government action, even when the decision to take that action is made through
procedures that are in themselves constitutionally adequate." ' 93 Even though the
Ninth Circuit subsequently overruled Sinaloa's substantive due process holding
in Armendariz v. Penman,94 Judge Alex Kozinski's opinion reflects very careful
consideration of the question and considerable analytic effort; his opinion
constitutes one of the most comprehensive and thoughtful recent judicial expositions on whether substantive due process protects property interests. Accordingly, the Sinaloa opinion merits more than passing scrutiny-Armendariz
notwithstanding.
In Sinaloa, the California Division of Safety of Dams ("the Division")
drained a lake in order to abate a flood threat caused in part by a leaking city
water main.9 5 The plaintiff, an association representing the homeowners living
near the lake, sued the city and the Division for the diminution in the value of
the homeowners' property, alleging violations of the Takings Clause, procedural
due process, and substantive due process. 96 Following the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal with
respect to the Takings Clause claim but reversed as to both the procedural and
substantive due process counts.9 7

Addressing the substantive due process claim, Judge Kozinski, writing for a
unanimous three-judge panel, opined that "the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause protects property no less than life and liberty." 9 8 Accordingly,
"[tlo the extent that arbitrary or malicious use of physical force violates
substantive due process, there is no principled basis for exempting the arbitrary
or malicious use of other governmental powers from similar constitutional
constraints." 99
The court's requirements for establishing a substantive due process claim
were minimal: "To establish a violation of substantive due process, the plaintiffs must prove that the government's action was 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.' "'00 However, Judge Kozinski was quite careful to limit the
scope of the federal judiciary's review of governmental action under the substan92. 882 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Armendariz v.
Penman, 73 E3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
93. Id. at 1407. A panel of the Eighth Circuit has reached the same conclusion. See Moore v.
Warwick Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 1986).
94. 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
95. Sinaloa, 882 F.2d at 1400-01.
96. Id. at 1401.
97. Id. at 1411.
98. Id. at 1408-09; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 453.
99. Sinaloa, 882 F.2d at 1409.
100. Id. at 1407 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
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tive aspect of the Due Process Clause: "[G]ovemmental entities must have
much latitude in carrying out their police power responsibilities; mere errors of
judgment, or actions that are mistaken or misguided, do not violate due process."' ' In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish that the
is,
government's action was "malicious, irrational and plainly arbitrary"-that
power." 10 2
state's
the
of
purview
legitimate
the
within
"not
unquestionably
Of particular significance was the panel's refusal to hold that either Parrattv.
Taylor'0 3 or Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank' 04 barred the plaintiff's substantive due process claim. Parrattgenerally
precludes due process claims for the wrongful acts of state employees if the act
in question was not authorized by law, policy, or custom.' 0 5 The Sinaloa court
noted that Parrattapplied only to procedural due process claims and declined to
06
Williamson County
apply it in the context of a substantive due process claim. i
must first exhaust
claim
Clause
a
Takings
holds that a would-be plaintiff with
U.S.C. § 1983.107
42
under
claim
a
bringing
before
any available state remedy
The Sinaloa court, however, found that Williamson County was inapplicable to
a substantive due process claim, explaining that Williamson County's exhausClause and "has no
tion requirement was solely a function of the Takings
08
claims."
constitutional
of
types
application to other
Judge Kozinski's approach to the recognition of substantive due process
property claims makes intuitive sense: any loss of property may give rise to a
substantive due process property claim, just as any limitation on liberty may
give rise to a substantive due process liberty claim. In the absence of a
"fundamental" property interest, however, a reviewing court should apply an
extremely deferential standard of review;" plaintiffs should prevail only in the
most extraordinary circumstances.
To be sure, Judge Kozinski's attempts to distinguish Parrattand Williamson
County rest on shaky doctrinal ground. If Parrattcan be avoided merely by
denominating a challenge to government action as "substantive" 'rather than
"procedural," Parratt's precedential force is significantly undercut. Justice
Kennedy has noted the potential corrosive force of this interpretation, suggesting that in the context of substantive due process, this distinction "could render
101. Id. at 1409.
102. Id.
103. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
104. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
105. Parratt,451 U.S. at 541-43.
106. Sinaloa, 882 F.2d at 1407, 1410 n.16; cf Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d 285, 287-88 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that Parrattbars substantive due process actions for the loss or impairment of
property rights), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1129 (1994).
107. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186-95.
108. Sinaloa, 882 F.2d at 1404, 1407; cf Gamble, 5 F.3d at 287-88 (holding that Williamson County
bars substantive due process actions for the loss or impairment of property rights unless the plaintiff
first exhausts all avenues of relief under state law).
109. See generally New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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Parratta dead letter." 1 0 Justice Kennedy's proposed solution-also endorsed
by Justice Thomas-would be to apply the Parrattrule "[i]n the ordinary case
where an injury has been caused not by a state law, policy, or procedure, but by
a random and unauthorized act that can be remedied by state law," regardless of
whether the claim at issue is denominated "procedural" or "substantive." ,"
Justice Stevens also has addressed the Parrattparadox but reached a different

conclusion; he observes that "[i]f one views ... [a] claim as one of substantive

due process, Parratt is categorically inapplicable."" 2 Like Judge Kozinski,
Justice Stevens would limit Parratt to instances in which it is simply not
possible to provide process prior to a deprivation of liberty or property-such as
cases in which the deprivation is not authorized by law or policy. " 3
Given the diametrically opposed views of Justices Kennedy and Stevens and
the lack of guidance on this precise point from a majority of the Supreme Court,
Judge Kozinski's decision to embrace Justice Stevens's position seems reasonable. Judge Kozinski's interpretation of Parrattreads the decision narrowly, but
plausibly: in the context of analyzing whether predeprivation process is mandatory, it makes little sense to require a governmental entity to provide process
prior to a completely unauthorized act. The state agent who abridges a liberty or
property interest without providing process is unlikely to be deterred by a pro
forma process requirement-after all, we have already posited that the state
does not condone the underlying conduct itself. When, however, the conduct is
wholly irrational and arbitrary-for example, when it is both intentional and
unquestionably wrongful-a would-be plaintiff should be permitted to bring a
substantive due process challenge. This also constitutes sound public policy: if
conduct is both intentional and plainly wrongful, a substantive due process
action should have a significant deterrent effect. In sum, Judge Kozinski's
contention that a substantive due process violation may exist in the absence of a
procedural due process claim is ultimately quite persuasive.
Judge Kozinski's treatment of Williamson County also is defensible, if potentially controversial. One could argue that if a plaintiff suffering the loss of
property can proceed simply by alleging a denial of substantive due process,
Williamson County would be rendered useless. However, would-be plaintiffs
cannot escape Williamson County so easily: under Judge Kozinski's parsing of
substantive due process, a government agency can easily defeat the substantive
due process claim unless it has acted in an utterly arbitrary fashion. This is a
substantially more difficult test than a plaintiff would face under the Takings
Clause.' 14 Thus, substantive due process claims are not interchangeable with
110. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 285 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
113. Id. at 315 & n.37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. See.Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122-28 (1978) (noting
that
relevant considerations as to whether a "taking" has occurred may include the economic impact
of the
regulation, the extent to which the regulation frustrates distinct investment-backed expectations,
or any
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Takings Clause claims." 5 Once again, Judge Kozinski's analysis rings true.
Unfortunately, the Sinaloa analysis no longer represents the law of the Ninth
Circuit. In Armendariz v. Penman, 1 6 the Ninth Circuit disavowed the substantive due process analysis set forth by Judge Kozinski in Sinaloa.' 7 Relying on
the Supreme Court's decisions in Albright v. Oliver" 8 and Graham v. Connor," 9 Judge Fletcher, writing for the en banc court, held that the Takings
Clause preempted any reliance on substantive due process to protect economic
or property rights.' 20 The Armendariz court did not, however, leave persons
subjected to arbitrary deprivations of property without a remedy; the court
instead construed the Takings Clause to prohibit such "private takings," suggesteven if the government's
ing that the spirit of the provision would afford relief
2'
'
Clause.
Takings
the
of
letter
the
meet
action did not
The Ninth Circuit's solution to the problem provides an alternative, but
inferior, theoretical framework for protecting citizens from arbitrary government action. The Armendariz court failed to appreciate the gravamen of a
substantive due process action for the arbitrary deprivation of property. It is not
the loss of property that justifies the22claim, but rather the arbitrary and irrational
nature of the government's action.'
Judge Kozinski's opinion in Sinaloa recognized that whatever other constitutional rights citizens enjoy, they have a legitimate (and constitutionally cognizable) interest in being free from arbitrary and irrational government action.
The Takings Clause does not address itself to irrational government action; to
the contrary, its text speaks directly to occasions of presumptively rational
23
government behavior: the taking of private property for a public purpose.
"physical invasion" of property by the government); see also Alan E. Brownstein, ConstitutionalWish
Granting and the Property Rights Genie, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 7, 14-26 (1996) (noting that under
the current doctrine judges examine only the "effect" of the challenged state action-regardless of
other considerations such as intent-to determine whether a taking has occurred).
115. Moreover, even if one were to expand the universe of takings claims to include a more probing
standard of review for substantive due process claims involving "fundamental" property rights, see infra text
accompanying notes 317-22, such claims would not serve as a ready substitute for a standard takings
claim. This is so because such claims would necessarily proceed on different (and more demanding) proofs and
would likely provide more limited recoveries. See generally Brownstein, supranote 114, at 14-26 (noting that
takings claims are generally easier to prove than substantive due process or equal protection claims).
116. 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
117. Id. at 1318-26.
118. 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality opinion).
119. 490 U.S. 386 (1990).
120. Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1318-26. Of course, substantive due process provides the theoretical
glue for applying the Takings Clause against the states. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 n.5
(1994); cf Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
121. See Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1324-25; see also Covington Court, Ltd. v. Village of Oak Brook,
77 F.3d 177, 179 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the Takings Clause could be interpreted to provide
relief for "a governmental taking of property for a private purpose").
122. See Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 487-90 (arguing that "procedural grossness" should itself be
prohibited by due process, regardless of whether a property or liberty interest is clearly at stake).
123. The Takings Clause appears as part of the Fifth Amendment and provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.

1997]

FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Judge Fletcher's textual exegesis of the Takings Clause-reading it to apply to
nonpublic takings-is a much bigger analytical leap than Judge Kozinski's
atextual recognition of a generalized right to be free of grossly unreasonable
government action affecting property interests.' 2 4
Contrary to Judge Fletcher's assertion, Graham and Albright-which preclude the use of substantive due process to challenge government behavior if a
more specific provision of the Constitution provides a relevant decisional
principle-should not be read to preclude all substantive due process protection
for property interests. A would-be § 1983 plaintiff should be permitted to bring
a claim for an utterly arbitrary deprivation of a property interest because the
government's action in such a case goes well beyond the compass of the
Takings Clause. A plaintiff should not be barred from relying on the protections
afforded by substantive due process simply because she may also possess a
claim-based on different facts and proofs-under the Takings Clause. 125 Indeed, the continued willingness of other courts of appeals to permit substantive
due process challenges to arbitrary government actions affecting property rights
demonstrates that Graham and Albright need not be read in the sweeping
fashion set forth in Armendariz.
Perhaps Armendariz may best be understood as another step toward transfer-

124. Note that the recognition of such substantive due process claims would not necessarily
duplicate the protections afforded under the procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause. Sometimes
the government can act in a procedurally proper way-providing notice, an opportunity to be heard,
and the other various components of procedural due process-without acting rationally in a substantive
way. Thus, classic procedural due process cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), do not preempt the need for substantive due process review of
government behavior. To be sure, if the process provided incorporates the various safeguards set forth
in Goldberg v. Kelly, it is highly unlikely that the ultimate result reached in the proceedings will be
utterly devoid of reason or wholly irrational. However, under the balancing employed in Mathews v.
Eldridge, Goldberg-type process is not generally applicable to routine (or even trivial) liberty and
property interests. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 346-49. Therefore, constitutionally adequate
procedures may not prevent an arbitrary or irrational decision by an agent of the government. See
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1977) (holding that the availability of civil and criminal
sanctions affords adequate protection against and a remedy for unjustified corporal punishment in
schools); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1976) (finding that false reasons given by city
manager for police officer's discharge, stated to him in private, had "no different" impact on the
officer's reputation than if they had been true and did not support his claim that a constitutionally
protected liberty interest had been impaired). In such circumstances, substantive due process should
provide a final bulwark against wholly arbitrary or irrational government behavior. See Lowrance v.
Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that government action might be so arbitrary that it
violates substantive due process "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used"). But see McKinney v. Pate, 20 E3d 1550, 1556-57 (11 th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting county employee's substantive
due process claim of alleged retaliatory termination in light of the court's holding that substantive rights
created by state law, such as public employment, are not subject to substantive due process protection
under the Due Process Clause because substantive "due process rights" are created only by the
Constitution), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
125. See, e.g., Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215-18 (6th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing six different kinds of substantive due process claims that might arise from government action
affecting property).
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ring substantive due process review of governmental actions from the Due
Process Clause to the Takings Clause.' 26 Such a transfer of constitutional load
bearing makes little sense, however, because of the major reconfiguration (and
expansion) necessary to accommodate all property claims within the ambit of
the Takings Clause. For example, Judge Fletcher had to read the "public
purpose" limitation out of the Takings Clause in order to make the clause reach
the government action at issue in Armendariz. 27 Graham and Albright will not
significantly advance the clarity of constitutional law if these decisions mean
that federal appellate courts should tear constitutional provisions free of their
textual moorings in order to shoehorn generalized claims into specific constitutional guarantees. 28 Whatever dangers may be associated with substantive due
process review of economic regulation are no more (and arguably less) serious
the loose form of antitextual interpretivism recomthan the dangers posed by
29
mended by Armendariz.'
3. The Eleventh Circuit's Attempt to Close the Door on Nonfundamental
Property Rights
In McKinney v. Pate,130 the Eleventh Circuit systematically considered the
nature of substantive due process challenges and refused to recognize a large
subset of such claims. Like Armendariz, McKinney represents an incomplete
(and therefore failed) effort to reconceptualize substantive due process.
126. See, e.g., Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d 654, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1995) (characterizing
"irrational action" review of government actions affecting property as a subset of Takings Clause
claims). At least arguably, the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence is also an example of
this trend. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
127. See Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1324 & n.8.
128. Judge Fletcher acknowledged that the behavior at issue-the summary closure of a number of
apartment buildings in San Bernardino-could be addressed as a special subset of substantive due
process. Id. Ironically, she characterized the Takings Clause as a "more explicit source" for the right to
be free from arbitrary government action affecting a property interest while at the same time remodeling the very text of the Takings Clause to create a preemptive remedy for nonpublic takings. Cf.
Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d 285, 286-87 (7th Cir. 1993) (characterizing takings claims, when
conducted for a nonpublic purpose, as substantive due process claims), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1129
(1994); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing
the theoretical possibility of Takings Clause claims for takings that lack a public purpose-that is,
"private purpose" takings). The local government's attempts to regulate the conditions under which
apartments could be rented constituted neither a "taking" of private property nor "the use" of the
property for a "public purpose." Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1320-21. San Bernardino did not take control
of the apartments, nor did the public benefit generally from the improved living conditions mandated by
the local regulations. See id. at 1314-15, 1321 (describing plaintiffs' allegations that San Bernardino's
enforcement program was aimed at aiding a property developer's efforts to obtain the plaintiffs' land
and/or at ridding the neighborhood of undesirable residents).
129. These dangers include the specter of the federal judiciary sitting as a kind of Council of
Revision over decisions that are essentially public policy choices, see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), and the inherently subjective nature of recognizing and applying atextual constitutional
rights, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
130. 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995); see also David H.
Armistead, Note, Substantive Due Process Limits on Public Officials' Powers to Terminate StateCreatedPropertyInterests, 29 GA. L. REv. 769, 786-97 (1995) (discussing and criticizing McKinney).
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Millard McKinney claimed that he had been unconstitutionally deprived of a
property interest in continued employment with Osceola County, Florida.' 3 '
Although the county had provided McKinney with pretermination process,
McKinney argued that the process was a sham and that the county had violated
his substantive due process right to be free of grossly arbitrary governmental
132
actions affecting a cognizable state-created property interest.
In an opinion by Chief Judge Tjoflat, the Eleventh Circuit-sitting en bancannounced a flat prohibition on the use of substantive due process to review
irrational or arbitrary government actions affecting the employment interests of
state and local workers. 133 No matter how outrageous the government's conduct, Judge Tjoflat explained, discharge from public employment can only
34
result in a violation of proceduraldue process. 1
The court reasoned that because public employment-a state-created property interest-is not "fundamental," it does not qualify for substantive due
process protection under the "fundamental rights" rubric of substantive due
process. 135 This rejection of substantive due process protection for nonfundamental property interests, such as continued employment with a public agency, is
unpersuasive.
No matter how pristine the process provided, a government action that is
wholly arbitrary and irrational should be subject to due process attack as a
matter of substantive, rather than procedural, due process. 136 The McKinney
37
court rejected this principle, relying instead on language in Bishop v. Wood
suggesting that the federal courts do not exist to serve as a civil service review
board for disgruntled state employees. 138 However, the Eleventh Circuit missed
the virtuous mean between the two extremes: as the Second Circuit has noted,
"Substantive due process protects individuals against government action that is
arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional sense, but not
against all government action that is 'incorrect or ill-advised.' "139
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit erred in flatly prohibiting the use of substantive

131. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1554.
132. Id. at 1555.
133. Id. at 1560.
134. Id. at 1558-61.
135. Id. at 1560-61. This portion of the court's opinion makes sense, for it implicitly recognizes that
a fundamental property interest would be protected by substantive due process. See Regents of the
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
136. See Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that arbitrary government
action may violate due process regardless of procedural fairness); Interport Pilots Agency v. Sammis,
14 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
137. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
138. See id. at 349-50 ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee
against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions."); see also McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1559-60.
139. Lowrance, 20 F.3d at 537 (quoting Bishop, 426 U.S. at 350 (citations omitted)); see also
Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the "measure of judicial restraint"
mandated by Bishop "does not require slavish deference to a university's arbitrary deprivation of a
vested property right").
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due process to challenge arbitrary government actions affecting nonfundamental
property interests in public employment. Bishop simply does not support such a
sweeping prohibition, 4 ° nor is such a result doctrinally consistent with the
courts') 4 ' approach to reviewing, for
Supreme Court's (and federal appellate
142
example, arbitrary zoning decisions.
The Supreme Court's language in Bishop must therefore mean that in most
instances, federal courts should not use substantive due process to review the
merits of employment decisions. Bishop does not speak to extraordinary cases
in which the governmental entity has acted in a completely arbitrary and lawless
fashion.' 4 3 Understood this way, Bishop does not pose an absurd distinction
decisions.' 44
between irrational zoning decisions and irrational employment
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit properly resolved the question left dangling in
140. See Lowrance, 20 F.3d at 537 (distinguishing instances of mere error from instances of
arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive government action); Interport Pilots Agency, 14 F3d at
144 (same).
141. See, e.g., Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1220-22 (6th Cir. 1992) (recognizing
substantive due process rights implicated by allegedly arbitrary refusal to grant rezoning request).
142. Since the 1920s, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to permit the federal courts
to serve as appellate zoning review boards. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1974)
(considering substantive due process claim arising from allegedly arbitrary definition of "family" in
zoning ordinance); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263
(1972) (recognizing plaintiff's right "to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning decisions"); Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928) (considering substantive due process claim arising from
allegedly arbitrary interferences with property rights by zoning ordinance). It would be odd indeed if
substantive due process protected citizens from irrational zoning decisions but not irrational employment decisions. Plainly, a citizen's interest in continued employment may be of a higher order than her
interest in the outcome of many zoning disputes. See, e.g., DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53
F.3d 592 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff claiming that substantive due process prohibited a local zoning board from
revoking a variance permitting the operation of an automobile repair shop), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352
(1995); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 E2d 1285 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff claiming that
substantive due process prohibited township from arbitrarily withholding a permit to operate a billiards
hall), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 914 (1993).
143. See Lowrance, 20 F.3d at 537.
144. The McKinney court was careful to distinguish between "legislative" and "nonlegislative"
cases. A "legislative" case involves a rule of general applicability, whereas a "nonlegislative" case
involves the application of preexisting rules to a particular individual. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550,
1557 n.9 (lth Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995). The court held that substantive
due process challenges involving legislative acts--even those implicating public employment-remain
viable. Id.; see also TRM, Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 941, 945 n.17 (lth Cir. 1995). Conceivably,
one could denominate all zoning decisions "legislative" in nature and most personnel decisions
"nonlegislative," thereby avoiding the absurdity of conferring superior substantive due process rights
on real property. However, this distinction should be rejected, because "[i]t may be safely said that
there is 'no bright line' between the legislative and administrative functions" in the context of zoning.
Pearson,961 F.2d at 1221 (citation omitted).
Alternatively, the McKinney court's assertion that legislative acts should fall more readily under
substantive due process scrutiny may be incorrect. The Second Circuit has held that legislative acts
should receive greater deference than nonlegislative acts when being subjected to substantive due
process review. See Interport Pilots Agency v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 133, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second
Circuit's logic is that a formal legislative policy choice deserves more judicial deference than the
unauthorized and isolated act of a renegade governmental agent. Id. The McKinney court's approach is
exactly the opposite: legislative acts are subject to substantive due process review, while nonlegislative
acts are completely immune from such scrutiny. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557 n.9.
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Sinaloa by concluding that substantive due process does protect "fundamental"
property interests in the same fashion that it protects fundamental liberty
interests. However, McKinney's substantive due process analysis remains incomplete (and deeply flawed) because it fails to recognize that the doctrine also
protects citizens from wholly irrational government action regardless of the
nonfundamental nature of the right at issue.
4. Conflicting Intracircuit Approaches to the Protection of Property Under the
Doctrine of Substantive Due Process
In addition to the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, several other courts of appeals
have addressed-often in ways quite at odds with the approaches outlined
above-the question whether substantive due process protects property interests. Even at the most basic level, there is a remarkable inconsistency regarding
whether substantive due process protects property interests. An examination of
cases from the Third, Sixth, and Second Circuits will illustrate the current
confusion in substantive due process jurisprudence and the resulting need for
clarification by the Supreme Court.
a. The Third Circuit. In Reich v. Beharry,145 the Third Circuit held that "not
all property interests worthy of procedural due process protection are protected
by the concept of substantive due process." 146 Reich, an attorney serving as a
county special prosecutor, brought a substantive due process claim to recover
payment for legal services that he rendered in investigating Beharry, the county
controller. 47 The county could not pay Reich's bill without approval from Beharry,
4 8
who had been acquitted of any wrongdoing and refused to give her consent. 1
Under Judge Kozinski's formulation of substantive due process for nonfundamental property rights, Reich would have prevailed if we assume that Beharry's
behavior was utterly arbitrary and irrational. 4 9 However, the Third Circuit
declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's approach and instead limited the availability of substantive due process review to claims implicating "fundamental"
property rights.' 50 Because it declined to recognize a claim for nonfundamental
property rights, the Third Circuit did not have to address the consistency of its
holding with either Williamson County or Parratt.

145. 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1989).
146. Id. at 244.
147. Id. at 239-40.
148. Id.
149. See Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407-10 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc). It is possible, of course, that Beharry's behavior was not irrational. If, in fact, Reich's
investigation of Beharry was completely unwarranted and an inappropriate use of taxpayer money,
Beharry might have been on solid legal ground in refusing to pay Reich's bill. The reported decision
does not provide sufficient facts to determine whether Beharry was a prudent guardian of the taxpayer's
purse or an irrational and vindictive local bureaucrat.
150. Reich, 883 F.2d at 243-45.
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5
Four years later, in Taylor Investment, Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township,, ' the
Third Circuit revisited the viability of a substantive due process claim to protect
nonfundamental property rights. The plaintiffs claimed that Upper Darby Township had arbitrarily denied them a permit to operate a billiards hall. Rather than
making an administrative appeal, the plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action claiming
that they had been denied procedural due process, substantive due process, and
dismissed the complaint,
equal protection of the laws. 152 The district court 153
decision.
for
ripe
yet
not
were
holding that the claims
Applying Williamson County, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal.' 54 However, in so doing, the court noted that "[t]o prevail on a
substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an arbitrary and
55 The panel
capricious act deprived them of a protected property interest."'
found that the plaintiffs presented a viable substantive due process claim but,
citing Williamson County, held that the claim was not ripe because the plaintiffs
had failed to exhaust all state administrative remedies. 156 The panel did not cite
Reich v. Beharry and made no attempt to square its holding with the earlier
case.
57
More recently, in DeBlasio v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,' the Third
Circuit distinguished Reich and granted a substantive due process claim involving a local zoning board's allegedly irrational decision that an automobile repair
shop violated zoning ordinances. The panel opined that "ownership is a property interest worthy of substantive due process protection" and held that Reich
did not preclude a substantive due process challenge to an adverse zoning
decision.' 58 The DeBlasio court evidently believed that zoning restrictions
adversely affecting a property owner's use of land implicated a higher order
value than an attorney attempting to collect his fee.
In fact, the Third Circuit has recognized a distinction without a difference.
Reich's interest in collecting his fee is economically no different than DeBlasio's interest in operating his shop. Both claimed that government officials
burdened their enjoyment of property rights for irrational or arbitrary reasons.
To hold that DeBlasio stated a valid substantive due process claim while Reich
did not is simply nonsensical. Accordingly, in the aftermath of DeBlasio it is
difficult to state the law of the Third Circuit regarding the status of substantive
due process property claims. (Perhaps auto mechanics enjoy substantive due
process protection while attorneys do not, with the precise rights of other
professions to be determined.)

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

983 F.2d 1285 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 914 (1993).
Id. at 1289.
Id.
Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1292-93.
53 F.3d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 352 (1995).
Id. at 600-01.
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The problem stems from the Reich panel's refusal to recognize a substantive
due process claim for wholly arbitrary or irrational government actions or to
apply a suitably deferential standard of review in such cases. The DeBlasio
panel held--quite correctly-that substantive due process affords an avenue of
relief when wholly arbitrary government action burdens a state-created property
interest.' 59 Of course, all property interests, whether or not "fundamental,"
should be afforded protection under the basic rationality requirement; on the
other hand, only fundamental property interests should benefit from heightened
judicial scrutiny. Unfortunately, Reich missed this point entirely, and DeBlasio
failed to correct it. The result is a muddled substantive due process jurisprudence that lacks both consistency and coherence.
b. The Sixth Circuit. Like the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has made
contradictory statements about a plaintiff's ability to use substantive due process
60
to protect.property rights. In a line of cases beginning with Charles v. Baesler,
the Sixth Circuit has held that "[m]ost, if not all, state-created contract rights,
while assuredly protected by procedural due process, are not protected by
substantive due process." 161
Only " 'fundamental' interests" are "protected by
62
process."
due
substantive
Since Charles, however, Sixth Circuit panels have nevertheless approved the
use of substantive due process to challenge arbitrary or irrational governmental
actions affecting property interests of a nonfundamental nature.' 63 For example,
the Sixth Circuit has permitted disgruntled property owners to challenge adverse zoning decisions in federal court under the rubric of substantive due
process.' 64 It has also sanctioned the use of substantive due process when
property rights were adversely affected by government actions that "shock the
conscience.' 65 One panel recently opined that "[s]ubstantive due process
serves as a vehicle to limit various aspects of potentially oppressive government
action," including both official and legislative infringements of fundamental
rights. Moreover, it may serve "as a limitation on official misconduct, which
159. Id. at 601.
160. 910 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1990).
161. Id. at 1353.
162. Id.
163. See LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 E3d 1097, 1110-11 (6th Cir. 1995);
Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1367-68 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Mansfield Apartment Owners Ass'n
v. City of Mansfield, 988 F.2d 1469, 1477 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding no deprivation of a substantive due
process property right but also noting that "[slubstantive due process would require only that the
defendants show that its scheme is rationally related to the asserted legitimate governmental purpose of
maintaining a financially stable municipal entity" (citations omitted)).
164. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215-23 (6th Cir. 1992).
165. See LRL Properties,55 F.3d at 1111 (holding that substantive due process rights are implicated
when fundamental property interests are jeopardized, but rejecting claim that the right to participate in
federal housing program amounts to a fundamental property interest); United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v.
Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 35 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that substantive due process rights are implicated
when fundamental property interests are jeopardized, but rejecting claim that the right to government
adherence to published purchasing guidelines amounted to a fundamental property interest).
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although not infringing on a fundamental right, is so literally 'conscience
shocking,' hence oppressive, as to rise to the level of a substantive due process
violation."' 166 This last description of the scope of substantive due process
protection-expounded in 1996, some six years after the decision in Charlescompletely ignores Charles's admonition that only fundamental rights enjoy
substantive due process protection.
The inconsistency in the Sixth Circuit's jurisprudence reflects the material
omission committed by the Charles panel: substantive due process not only
protects fundamental rights, but also safeguards citizens from wholly arbitrary
governmental action. Accordingly, a plaintiff can raise a viable substantive due
167
process claim, even in the absence of a fundamental right. Like the Third
Circuit's, the Sixth Circuit's substantive due process jurisprudence is awash in
inconsistency and contradiction.
c. The Second Circuit. The Second Circuit has ostensibly limited the availabilrights. 168
ity of substantive due process to claims that implicate "fundamental"
Quoting the Sixth Circuit's decision in Charles, the court explained that "[w]e
do not think ...that simple, state-law contractual rights, without more, are

worthy of substantive due process protection." 169 Even after this declaration,
however, Second Circuit panels have continued to assert that substantive due
70
and "arbitrary,
process may be used to challenge local land use decisions
7' To date, the court
conscience-shocking, or oppressive" governmental actions.
has failed to explain this lack of consistency in its pronouncements on the scope
of substantive due process review.
5. The Seventh Circuit's Refusal to Recognize Substantive Due Process
Protection for Any Property Rights
The Seventh Circuit simply has refused to recognize the existence of substantive due process protection for property interests; such claims are cognizable
only when coupled with another substantive right, such as a takings claim: "[A]
substantive due process claim based on a state-created property interest is
cognizable where a plaintiff claims either a violation of some other substantive

166. Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996).
167. See Pearson,961 F.2d at 1215-23; Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d
1398, 1407-12 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman,
75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
168. Local 342, Long Island Pub. Serv. Employees v. Town Bd., 31 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (2d Cir.
1994).
169. Id.; cf.Fallon, supra note 91, at 353-55, 358-60, 363-64 (arguing that substantive due process
should protect nonfundamental interests from arbitrary or irrational abridgment and suggesting that the
federal Constitution also restrains the state's discretion to limit recognition of liberty and property
interests).
170. Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 680-81 (2d Cir. 1995).
171. Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 1995); Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d
529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994).
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constitutional right or that the state law remedies are inadequate." 172 Prior to
this statement, the Seventh Circuit-like the Third Circuit-had permitted
substantive due process challenges to local zoning board decisions.173 The most
recent decisions of the court, however, strongly suggest that such challenges
74
will no longer be permitted. 1

In a pair of opinions, Chief Judge Richard Posner and Judge Frank Easterbrook have effectively incorporated substantive due process protection of nonfundamental property rights into the Takings Clause. 175 Judge Easterbrook maintains
that " '[s]ubstantive due process' has the distinct disadvantage ...of having

been abolished in the late 1930s when the Supreme Court threw over Lochner." 176 Thus, "[e]conomic substantive due process is not just embattled; it has
been vanquished." 177 In the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs with economic or prop172. Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 1989). In this regard, the Seventh Circuit's
approach is similar to the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 716-18
(5th Cir. 1987). In Schaper, the Fifth Circuit held that substantive due process protects property
interests but subordinated such claims to the Parrattrule in the absence of an "independent substantive
interest." Id. at 718; see Sheldon H. Nahmod, Due Process, State Remedies, and Section 1983, 34 KAN.
L. REV. 217, 233-34 (1985). Unless the plaintiff can tie the substantive due process claim to a specific
guarantee of the Bill of Rights, the claim will be subject to bar under the Parrattrule. Schaper, 813
F.2d at 718. Essentially, this means that the Fifth Circuit will not permit the use of substantive due
process to protect either routine or "fundamental" property interests unless the government's conduct
constitutes an independent constitutional wrong-for example, a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 717-18. The Fifth Circuit's approach simply folds substantive due process claims into routine
§ 1983 claims; a plaintiff can gain no ground by relying on "substantive due process" independent of a
separate constitutional right. More recently, however, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that substantive
due process protects nonfundamental property rights from utterly arbitrary government abridgment. See
FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that if
"government action is 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relationship
to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare' . .. it [may] be declared unconstitutional" (quoting
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)); Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565,
568-69 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a sufficiently arbitrary deprivation of a nonfundamental property
interest violates the guarantees of substantive due process).
173. See Polenz, 883 F.2d at 557-58 (citing numerous cases). Like most other U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals, the Seventh Circuit had permitted disgruntled property owners to use § 1983 and substantive
due process to challenge unfavorable local zoning decisions, presumably because the Supreme Court
had expressly endorsed review of such decisions. See supra note 142; see also Clark v. Winnebago
County, 817 F.2d 407, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1987) (deciding on the merits a substantive due process
challenge to an adverse zoning decision); Albery v. Reddig, 718 F.2d 245, 251 (7th Cir. 1983) (same);
cf Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 463-68 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.)
(permitting substantive due process challenge to an adverse zoning decision even while questioning the
doctrinal wisdom of permitting such claims in light of the Takings Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause).
174. See Polenz, 883 F.2d at 558-59; see also Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill.,
852 F2d 951, 958
(7th Cir. 1988) (limiting substantive due process claims to cases in which the plaintiff alleges that an
independent constitutional right has been violated or that the available state remedies are inadequate).
175. See Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995); Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d
285 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1129 (1994).
176. Gosnell, 59 F.3d at 657 (citation omitted).
177. Id. But see In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516, 521 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying rational
basis review to an economic substantive due process challenge to federal labor legislation). Indeed,
even the Supreme Court continues to review economic regulations under the Due Process Clause. See,
e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 638-41

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:555

erty claims must "make their arguments under the takings clause and the
rational-basis component of equal protection analysis." ' 78 In somewhat less
expansive language, Chief Judge Posner has written that the Takings Clause is
the principal constitutional source of protection for property rights and that in
any event, substantive due process claims are subject to bar under the Parratt
and Williamson County decisions. 179 Although the veracity of the position
espoused by Posner and Easterbrook may be subject to debate, its clarity and
consistency surely are not.
Recently, several Seventh Circuit panels have followed their lead. For example, in Covington Court, Ltd. v. Village of Oak Brook,180 the Seventh Circuit
refused to consider a substantive due process challenge to Oak Brook's disposition of a zoning dispute.' 8' The court reiterated its earlier observation that
"federal courts are not boards of zoning appeals"' 1 82 and upheld the district
court's dismissal of Covington's action. 18 3 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit
(unlike the Ninth Circuit) has broadly applied Williamson County and Parrattto
184 In consequence, such
bar most substantive due process property claims.
85
all.'
claims must be brought in state court or not at
6. Conclusion: E PluribusPluribus
The courts of appeals have created something of a patchwork of policies
regarding the viability of substantive due process property claims.1 86 The basic
fault lines center on whether substantive due process protects property rights at
all and, if so, whether it protects both fundamental and nonfundamental property rights. A related question is how substantive due process protection of
property interests can be squared with Williamson County and Parratt.For
(1993) (applying deferential review to substantive due process challenge to legislation imposing
penalty on company for withdrawal from pension plan).
178. Gosnell, 59 F.3d at 657.
179. Gamble, 5 F.3d at 286-88. But cf.Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d
1398, 1404-05, 1407-10 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the argument that Williamson County and Parrattbar
plaintiffs' § 1983 claim for breaching of a dam), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
180. 77 F.3d 177 (7th Cir. 1996).
181. Id. at 179-80. Oak Brook authorities failed to act on Covington's zoning application to
construct a residential housing subdivision until after Covington resolved the objections of a local
homeowner. After Covington spent over $100,000 on various improvements to the homeowner's
property, the homeowner withdrew his protest against the planned development. Id. at 178.
182. Id. at 179.
183. id. at 179-80.
184. See id.; River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1994); Gamble, 5
F.3d at 286-87. Similarly, Parrattholds that postdeprivation procedures preclude a § 1983 action for the
loss of property, at least where the plaintiff's claim socnds in procedural due process. Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981). Essentially, the Seventh Circuit has carried the Parratt rule over to
substantive due process claims: there can be no § 1983 action if the state's law of torts provides an
adequate remedy.
185. See River Park, 23 F.3d at 165-67 ("Federal litigation is not a repechage round for losers of
earlier contests, or for those who overslept and missed the starters' gun.").
186. For a more specific discussion of some of these cases, see Hillwig, supra note 91, at 718-39.
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reasons that will be developed more fully below, 87 Judge Kozinski's opinion in
Sinaloa offers the most coherent theory of substantive due process protection of
nonfundamental property interests. However, his theory-at least as set forth in
Sinaloa-is incomplete insofar as it fails to address "fundamental" property

interests. 188
D. IN PRAISE OF FOLLY: A PAEAN TO TRUAX V. CORRIGAN

The current confusion within the federal courts regarding the scope of
substantive due process protection of property interests indicates a need to
reexamine the wisdom of Truax-the Supreme Court's broadest application of
substantive due process to property interests. I maintain that there is a place for
Truax in the Supreme Court's contemporary substantive due process jurisprudence; it is time for the Court to come full circle and complete the task that it
began with Griswold in 1965.189
Of course, no responsible constitutional lawyer would attempt to defend the
result in Truax on the merits. The majority's approach reflects a rather naked
usurpation of legislative authority over routine labor relations. The Truax
majority also shows scant concern for the value of federalism, and it was
primarily because of this lack of concern that Justices Holmes and Brandeis
object to the majority's approach.' 90 Notwithstanding these infirmities, there is
more than a kernel of truth to the majority's basic theory of substantive due
process.
All nine Justices agreed that Truax's restaurant constituted a form of property; they simply disagreed about the nature of the property right at issue. Chief
Justice Taft, speaking for the five-Justice majority-and in contrast to the four

187. See infra notes 405-39 and accompanying text.
188. Cf Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws which
constitute "substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints" on fundamental liberties should
be overturned).
189. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was the Supreme Court's first post-New Deal
invocation and application of substantive due process to protect an unenumerated fundamental right.
From 1937 to 1965, the Court routinely sustained state legislation, however benighted or invasive,
applying a deferential "rational basis" standard of review when litigants challenged such laws on
substantive due process grounds. See, e.g., Poe, 367 U.S. at 516-19 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing
the Supreme Court's rejection of substantive due process in the post-New Deal era and arguing for its
resurrection because "to say that a legislature may do anything not within a specific guarantee of the
Constitution may be as crippling to a free society as to allow it to override specific guarantees so long
as what it does fails to shock the sensibilities of a majority of the Court"). However, unlike the
Lochner-era Court, the modern Supreme Court has applied substantive due process only to protected
fundamental liberty interests. Logically, Griswold should have been interpreted as a general revival of
substantive due process. See Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34, 45-51, 59-61 (arguing that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to draw a principled distinction that would permit substantive due process protection of
personal-but not of economic-rights). To date, the Supreme Court has not spoken to the existence of
fundamental property rights, preferring instead to shoehorn most important personal interests into the
construct of "liberty." See supra note 31.
190. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342-44 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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92
dissenting Justices 9 1-viewed the property right at issue as "fundamental." 1
Some of the very same Justices, when presented with substantive due process
claims involving "fundamental" liberty interests, would have voted to invalidate the offending state statutes.' 93 Both Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis
joined the majority opinion in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 194 which invalidated
an Oregon prohibition on parochial education. Similarly, two years before
Pierce, Justice Brandeis had joined the majority opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska, 95 which invalidated a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of
German.
Given their votes in Truax v. Corrigan,one could simply accuse Holmes and
Brandeis of a foolish inconsistency. As Professor David Currie has observed,
"The doctrinal basis for Meyer is as shaky as that of Lochner itself, for it is the
very same." 196 In truth, the votes of Holmes and Brandeis in these substantive
due process cases suggest that Truax should have a place in contemporary
substantive due process jurisprudence.
One should begin with the rather basic observation that the facts of Truax v.
Corrigan are utterly unremarkable. The English Kitchen, Truax's restaurant,
was a restaurant, like any other restaurant. Truax and his principals were free to
shutter it and to open one or a dozen new restaurants anywhere they wished in
Arizona. The restaurant was a fungible good, and any economic injury that they
suffered could have been redressed through the common law of torts. 197 The
majority's assertion that Truax had been "stripped of all real remedy"'198 is
simply false.
From these facts, careful lawyers (and careful jurists like Justices Holmes and
Brandeis) should draw three conclusions. First, Arizona's decision to withdraw
injunctive relief in labor disputes, codified in section 1464, did not materially
diminish Truax's property rights, because Arizona law did not fail to protect his
economic interests-it simply denied him an injunction to stop his former
employees from picketing his restaurant.
Second, the property rights at issue were not really "fundamental." If Arizona had attempted to abolish prospectively estates held in fee simple absolute,
had limited Truax's ability to transfer his property, or had otherwise tinkered

191. See id. at 342-43 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 347-48 (Pitney, J., dissenting); id. at 354-55
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 329.
193. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
194. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For a discussion of the holding in Pierce, see supra note 77.
195. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For a discussion of the holding in Meyer, see supra note 77.
196. Currie, supra note 34, at 82; see also Phillips, supra note 34, at 283-89 (arguing that the Court's
modem substantive due process jurisprudence has its roots in the Court's Lochner-eraprecedents).
197. To the extent that the workers' activities exceeded peaceful picketing and included threats and
intimidation, the torts of assault and tortious interference with contract provide immediate avenues of
relief. Moreover, the majority itself acknowledged that Truax and his partners had been libelled. Truax,
257 U.S. at 326. Once again, an action in tort would have been available to Truax for this particular
wrong.
198. Id. at 330.
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with Truax's basic common law interests in the restaurant itself, Truax may
have had a colorable claim that Arizona violated a "fundamental" interest.
However, the statute merely limited the availability of injunctions in labor
disputes, an exercise that has much more to do with the law of remedies and the
scope of equity jurisdiction than with property law.
Finally, even if one accepts Chief Justice Taft's characterization of Truax's
property interest as "fundamental," the state's interest in regulating labor
relations is sufficiently compelling to override this interest. Given the broadbased experimentation in labor policy that was occurring in the early twentieth
century,' 9 9 it was simply not plausible to argue seriously that Truax had an
absolute right to an injunction to protect his restaurant from disgruntled workers' pickets. 2°
This presents a stark contrast to the circumstances present in Pierce and
Meyer. A blanket prohibition on parochial schools, coupled with compulsory
attendance laws, effectively denied Oregon parents any choice in the primary
and secondary education of their children. The effects of this rule were potentially devastating, particularly to religious minorities. 20 1 Moreover, the damage
was not of a quantifiable nature; the parents could not sue the state and recover
adequate compensation for their children's lost educational opportunities. In this
instance, the liberty interest at issue was undeniably "fundamental," and no
remedy could effectively compensate for the ill effects of the Oregon statute.
To the extent that the Nebraska statute at issue in Meyer prohibited the
teaching of German but not other foreign languages and was directed at a
separate and distinct cultural minority within the state, the Equal Protection
Clause seems to provide a more sound constitutional basis for invalidating the
law than the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court, however, decided the

199. See id. at 356-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
200. Indeed, Congress expressly permitted this sort of activity in the Norris-La Guardia Act. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1994); Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, CongressionalObligation to Provide a
Forum for ConstitutionalClaims: DiscriminatoryJurisdictionalRules and the Conflict of Law, 69 VA.
L. REV. 819, 841 (1983) (describing and discussing the operation and effects of the Norris-La Guardia
Act); Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate Over Congress' Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1322-23 n.52 (1984) (same); see also JULIus G.
GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS 224-26 (1988) (describing and discussing the
history of the use of injunctions in labor disputes and Congress's response to this history in the
Norris-La Guardia Act); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1109, 1148-1233 (1989) (same). Moreover, the Act also prohibits the issuance of injunctions to
prohibit labor pickets. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15.
201. It is certainly plausible to suppose that elementary and secondary education in Oregon during
the 1920s included some sort of religious exercise-a daily prayer at a minimum. See generally David
B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74, 79, 84
(1968). It is doubtful, however, that these observances took into account the sensibilities of particular
religious denominations. See Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability of Religious
Inequality, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 569, 573-76. See generally Tyack, supra, at 80-82, 84-87, 90-92.
Moreover, it is likely that religious minorities existed in 1920s Oregon; indeed, this is suggested by the
existence of a strong Catholic community that wished to maintain a separate, private school system to
educate its youth. See Tyack, supra, at 85-86, 92.
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case on the basis of a "privacy" argument firmly grounded in substantive due
process. 20 2 The interest at issue-educating one's children-again seems more
"fundamental" than operating a restaurant free of labor pickets. As with Pierce,
any damage caused by the statute's operation could not easily be remedied.2 °3
The votes of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis in Pierce and Meyer are
therefore not inconsistent with their votes in Truax v. Corrigan. One could
reasonably infer that the Justices' seemingly inconsistent votes reflect the fact
that the interest at issue in Truax simply did not measure up; it was not
"fundamental" in any meaningful sense, and state-imposed burdens on nonfundamental interests-whether characterized as "liberty" or "property"--should
be subject to review only for rationality. Moreover, the state's interest in
adopting section 1464 did not reflect an attempt to marginalize a particular
cultural minority within Arizona, but rather reflected an attempt to create a more
even playing field between labor and management. The theory of fundamental
property rights espoused in Truax, if taken to its logical conclusion, would
preclude changes in the taxation of certain kinds of property (for example,
commercial property) if the changes were not also applied to all other kinds of
real estate. This approach to the protection of property rights is untenable, for it
would prevent legislative bodies from modifying-even at the margins-a raft
of statutes that affect completely fungible property interests.
Truax v. Corriganis not wrong in theory, however. Truax is exactly correct as
applied to nonfungible, or incommensurable, property rights. As Justice Harlan
explained in the context of a substantive due process liberty claim, "certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify' their abridgment." 204 Reputation and physical integrity are two examples
of such interests.2 °5
Like the raising of one's children, reputation and physical integrity are

202. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398-402 (1923).
203. Indeed, to the extent that the statute equated speaking German with being unpatriotic, it invited
children of German ancestry to abandon their cultural heritage completely. Damage of this sort is
irreparable, for once the traditions of the Old Country are lost in one generation, they are gone forever.
See KURT VONNEGUT, PALM SUNDAY 21-22 (1981) (describing the Indianapolis German community's
loss of its cultural traditions following World War I because of public disapprobation of such
traditions); see also KURT VONNEGUT, FATES WORSE THAN DEATH 199-200 (1991) (same).
204. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Fallon, supra note
92, at 314-15, 353-55, 358-60, 363-64 (arguing for high level of scrutiny of state interests when
government actions abridge due process liberties); Henkin, supra note 61, at 491 n.39 (suggesting that
Truax may require states to protect basic property rights).
205. For a variety of reasons, notably including a consistent historical practice of limiting recoveries
for damage to reputation to economic injuries, reputation should be deemed a property, rather than a
liberty, interest. See infra Part IIA-B. Likewise, although bodily integrity could be conceptualized as
either property or liberty, one's interest in one's physical body (as opposed to freedom from bodily
restraint) is more approximately analogized to property than liberty. See supra note 31 and infra note
343. It seems nonsensical to describe one's physical body as a "liberty"-it is a thing, not a freedom to
do or refrain from doing a particular act. Thus, it makes sense to speak of a liberty interest in being free
from false imprisonment, but it seems awkward in the extreme to claim a "liberty" interest in
compensation for a botched operation to remove an ingrown toenail.
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incommensurable interests: no amount of money can restore them once they are
lost. Indeed, one could reasonably argue that incommensurability, rather than a
characterization of an interest as "liberty" or "property," should serve as the
prime marker of a "fundamental" interest. Marriage, °6 the decision to have a
°9
child,20 7 child rearing,20 8 and voting 220920
are all incommensurable interests. 210
This incommensurability helps to establish their fundamental nature. 11
It may be, as Justice Stevens has suggested in a number of procedural due
process cases, that most property interests are commensurable-they have a
value that can be assessed objectively, and a person who suffers a deprivation of

206. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the right to marry is a fundamental
liberty interest).
207. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that the right to have an abortion is a
fundamental privacy interest); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the
decision to use contraceptives is among fundamental privacy interests).
208. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (holding that freedom of choice in
conduct of family life is a fundamental liberty interest); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (holding that the right of parents to direct upbringing of their children is a fundamental
liberty interest); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that the right of parents to
direct the education of their children is a fundamental liberty interest).
209. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960) (holding that redistricting statute which
effectively denies vote to blacks violates the Fifteenth Amendment); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 476
(1953) (holding that manipulation of local party nominations which effectively denies votes to blacks
violates the Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62 (1944) (holding that the
right to vote in primary and general elections without discrimination is fundamental).
210. Some law and economics adherents would argue that all human interests are commensurable,
that everything has an economic foundation. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992)
(describing the ostensible economic foundations of love, romance, and marriage). However, most
Americans do not embrace this hypercynical cosmology. The law and economics movement certainly
has provided a unique and often useful means of describing human relations. To say that this approach
is the only means--or even the best means-of modelling human behavior requires a leap of faith that
cold economic logic cannot, on its own terms, justify. Ultimately, law and economics cannot prove its
own veracity by offering up its foundational premises as a proof of its truth. Compare Allan C.
Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation (with Suggestions on How to Make
Bouillabaisse),60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 878-79 (1985) (arguing that "[t]he law and economics story is a
form of worldmaking that has achieved a high and undeserved political status in the world of legal
theory" and "is not so much wrong as simplistic"); Margaret J. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 57-60 (1993) (arguing that "market rhetoric is a form of reductionism" that
fails to account satisfactorily for all relevant variables) and Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 813-18 (1994) (questioning the ability of economic modelling
to account for all of the variabilities and subject values that constitute human experience) with Richard
A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683,
691-98, 705-15 (rejecting the incommensurability objection to law and economics analysis and positing
that economic models of human behavior provide a simpler, more empirically verifiable, and hence
superior means of explaining and predicting human behavior).
211. Of course, tradition remains relevant to determining whether an interest is fundamental because
incommensurability is a function of the social value that Americans historically have placed on
particular interests. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504 n.12 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972), for the proposition that substantive due process rights are recognized because they reflect
" 'strong tradition[s]' founded on 'the history and culture of Western civilization' "). But cf Fallon,
supra note 91, at 314-20 (arguing that tradition is a difficult concept to apply consistently and
predictably and suggesting that other approaches to limiting substantive due process might better serve
important constitutional and prudential values).
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most types of property rights can be made whole after the fact.2 1 2 In most cases
involving most property rights, this analysis likely holds true. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court should recognize that at least some property interests, like some
are incommensurable and therefore should be deemed "fundaliberty interests,
21 3
mental."
Such a result would comport not only with the text of the Due Process
Clauses, but also with the Framers' broad understanding of "property" as a
concept encompassing not only tangible interests, but also values, beliefs, and
opinions.21 4 Madison wrote that property encompasses "a man's land, or merchandize, or money.''2 15 However, for Madison, "[i]n its larger and juster
meaning," the concept of property also "embraces every thing to which a man
may attach a value and have a right," including a person's "opinions, his
person, his faculties, [and] his possessions. ' 21 6 In Madison's view, "[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort.", 21 7 Although Madison's
conception of property is particularly broad, his views were relatively common
in late eighteenth-century America: "As a legal concept, property enjoyed
greater status in the early United States than it does today," and "[t]he early
far beyond physical possessions to
legal conception of property extended
2 18
encompass the essence of human life.",
Professor Laura Underkuffler has explored the remarkably comprehensive

212. Justice Stevens consistently has espoused this point of view, most recently in Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 315-16 n.37 (1994) (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (arguing that in some circumstances
postdeprivation procedures can provide adequate due process for deprivations of liberty); see also
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the constitutional
requirement of due process is consistent with the conclusion that a postdeprivation remedy may be
constitutionally sufficient).
213. Cf Epstein, supra note 210, at 698-705 (arguing that legal rules need not address incommensurable values precisely because such values cannot be measured reliably). See generally Randolph J.
Haines, Note, Reputation, Stigma, and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV.
191, 206 (1977) (criticizing the Paul Court for allowing its restrictive interpretation of the Due Process
Clause to preclude a constitutional remedy pursuant to § 1983).
214. See MADISON, supra note 11, at 266-68.
215. Id.
216. Id.; see also James Madison, Note to His Speech on the Right of Suffrage, in 3 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 450, 450 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) ("In civilized communities,

property as well as personal rights is an essential object of the laws.., the rights both of property [and]
...of persons ought to be effectually guarded."); THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 370 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("Government is instituted no less for the protection of the property, than of
the persons of individuals."); Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American ConstitutionalLaw,
12 MICH. L. REv. 247, 271-72 (1914) ("These words [in Madison's Property] are important as showing
the elasticity attaching to the term 'property,' as used by American statesmen, from the beginning.").
217. MADISON, supra note 11, at 266.

218. Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Comment, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1037, 1053-54 (1993); see also Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46
S.C. L. REv. 531, 538-41 (1995) (arguing that the Framers' conception of property interests was
remarkably broad and concluding that "there is no basis on which to limit the term artificially, and a
good deal of evidence that the intuitively broad meaning-for it is a broad term-is the correct one");
Corwin, supra note 216, at 271-72 (noting Madison's elastic understanding of the concept of property).
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conception of property held by the Framers. 2t 9 She describes Madison's essay
as "curious and provocative," but notes that "the existence of a broader
understanding
of property during the Founding Era has been widely recog220
nized."
Given this understanding, the textual equality of property and liberty in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment takes on added significance: the
Framers conceptualized many important interests as sounding in "property"
rather than in "liberty." Accordingly, the textual equality of liberty and property
in the Due Process Clauses is not merely a rhetorical flourish, but rather
embodies an important political idea: the notion that property facilitates personal and political self-determination. 22 ' Under this view, property is not a
sterile collection of tangible goods and economic rights, but rather a "broad
range of human rights," including "the maintenance of personal integrity in
both a physical and nonphysical sense,"
that are intimately related to "the
22 2
development of human personality."
In light of the Framers' comprehensive understanding of property, Professor
Underkuffler rightly asks "why ... the comprehensive approach [is] overlooked." ' 223 I posit that the Supreme Court's discredited experiment with "economic due process" played no small role in eviscerating the legal relevance of
property as a useful construct for protecting individual rights and personal
autonomy. The ghost of Lochner has spooked both academics and jurists into
ignoring the construct of property in substantive due process theory, thereby
eliminating an important subset of fundamental interests from protection against
governmental abridgment. If Madison's conception of property "is radically
different from the ordinary understanding of property today,", 224 it may also be
said that the Supreme Court's present inability to recognize property as an
attribute of both personal autonomy and political participation would be equally
strange to Madison.
As a matter of text, as a matter of history, and as a matter of doctrine, this
result is nonsensical. It is time for the Supreme Court to banish the ghost of
Lochner and reestablish doctrinal symmetry between its protection of property
and liberty under the umbrella of its substantive due process jurisprudence. In
219. See Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property:An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 133-42 (1990).
220. Id. at 136. She concludes that "[t]he broad conception of property found in Madison's essay,
and implicit in the writings of others in the Founding Era, is not an aberration in intellectual history."
Id. at 137. English political philosophers, including John Locke, viewed property as including important aspects of self. Id. at 137-38; see also John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based
Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 64-71 (1996) (noting the Lockean nature of
Madison's conception of free speech as a kind of property interest).
221. See Underkuffler, supra note 219, at 137-42.
222. Id. at 138-40. In addition to Madison, Alexander Hamilton and Associate Justice Joseph Story
also assimilated into the rubric of "property" autonomy interests that today constitute "liberties." See
id. at 136-37; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 589-99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(arguing that the Constitution will protect both liberty and property rights).
223. Underkuffler, supra note 219, at 141.
224. Id. at 136.
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sum, Truax v. Corrigan is the right theory on the wrong facts; on the proper
facts, the Supreme Court should once again embrace substantive due process
protection of property interests.22 5
II. THE THEORY APPLIED: REPUTATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY RIGHT

Reputation provides an excellent example of a "fundamental" property
interest. Many (if not most) people would agree that reputation constitutes a
precious commodity, a commodity that they expect the state to protect under its
laws. 2 2 6 Reputation also qualifies as a "natural" property. 227 Finally, the protection of reputation from both private and public harms enjoys a long and proud
history in the common law of the several states. 228 It would therefore be
reasonable to posit that legislative efforts to restrict or rescind the protection of
reputation (for example, incident to a tort reform project) should be subjected to

strict judicial scrutiny.
This view might require modification, however, upon a careful reading of
Paul v. Davis.22 9 In Paul, the Supreme Court held that reputation does not
constitute a "liberty" interest for purposes of applying the procedural aspect of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 230 To be sure, the Court did
225. See id.
226. See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 781 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion for attaching no weight to state's interest in protecting individual reputation, thereby achieving a "pernicious result"); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S.
749, 793 n.16 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that individual's interest in preserving
reputation is central to notions of human dignity); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 261-62 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that freedom of press has never included right to
publish falsehoods that damage individual reputation and noting that the Court has always cherished the
individual's interest in preserving her reputation); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92-94 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that the right to protection of one's reputation is "at the root of any
decent system of ordered liberty"); LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 293-94 (1978)
(arguing that "the interest in one's good name" has historically received protection as an "important
interest"); David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 524-27 (1991)
(criticizing malice standard used in libel suits as shielding makers of false and defamatory attacks on
reputation from liability); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV. 601, 616-17
(1990) (criticizing Falwell Court for ignoring essential link between individual dignity and reputation
recognized at common law).
227. By this I mean a personal asset that cannot be transferred, much like one's voice or habit.
However, unlike these natural properties, reputation can be taken by another, even if it cannot be
possessed by another-Shakespeare's point in Othello. Professor Van Alstyne has described a "natural"
property as
an asset one has simply as a person, an asset one can attempt to exploit commercially to
whatever grand or trivial extent one chooses, and an asset that (like one's natural freedom to
move about) is in no sense dependent in the first instance upon either state law granting it or a
constitutional provision establishing it.
Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 479 n.97.
228. A number of state constitutions have protected "reputation" or "good name" from state
infringement. See infra Part IIAL.
229. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
230. Id. at 699, 701, 711-13. For a discussion of the case, see infra Part IIB.
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not decide-and did not purport to decide-whether reputation falls under the
aegis of substantive due process.2 3' Nonetheless, Paul certainly makes it more
difficult to argue plausibly that it does. If one's interest in reputation is not
sufficiently weighty to trigger procedural due process protection, it may notShakespeare's potential objections notwithstanding--qualify for substantive protection either.
Intuitively, such a result seems misguided. After all, the complete failure to
protect one's interest in reputation falls short of merely protecting reputation
through postdeprivation processes. By closely examining an individual's interest in reputation, I will show that reputation indeed qualifies as a "fundamental"
property interest and, moreover, that substantive due process protection of
reputation is both appropriate and necessary.
A. REPUTATION AS PROPERTY

Some thirty years ago, Justice Potter Stewart described the right to recover
for defamation as "a basic [right] of our constitutional system.", 232 He observed:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified
invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the
essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of
233
any decent system of ordered liberty.

Justice Stewart concluded his defense of reputation by emphasizing that "the
poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society.", 234 In the intervening three decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
cited Justice Stewart's language to describe the importance of reputation.2 35
Both the history of the common law and the contemporary practice of the
states bear out Justice Stewart's observations about the importance of reputation
in American society. They do not, however, support his characterization of
reputation as a "liberty" interest. Instead, a careful examination of the current
and historical practices of the states reveals that reputation is essentially an
interest in property and, considered conjunctively, that history, tradition, and the
common law establish that reputation is afundamental property interest.

231. Compare Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-13 (finding respondent's claim "far afield" from decisions
regarding state power to substantively regulate conduct) with id. at 710-11 n.5 (clarifying that Court's
discussion is limited to proceduralguarantees of Due Process Clause).
232. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 94.
235. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-58 (1985); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 471
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 414 n.5 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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1. Reputation and the Practice of the States
Justice Stewart's solicitude for one's interest in reputation is consistent with
the importance that state constitutions and state supreme courts have historically
placed on one's interest in reputation. This historic interest, in turn, reflects and
incorporates long-held social values that place a premium on one's good name.
English common law long protected reputation as a property interest 236 and
the American colonial governments continued this tradition in their own common laws. 237 For example, Connecticut's colonial-era "Statutory Declaration of
Rights" provided that
no man's life shall be taken away: no man's honour or good name shall be
stained: no man's person shall be arrested, restrained, banished, dismembered,
nor any ways punished: no man shall be deprived of his wife or children: no
man's goods or estate shall be taken away from him, nor any ways indamaged
under the colour of law, or countenance of authority; unless clearly warranted
by the laws of this state.2 38

This provision was in effect from 1784 to 1818, and the first act of the
Connecticut Code of 1650 contained a largely identical provision. 239 To this
day, the Connecticut constitution "specifically protects a person's reputa240
tion."
Nor is Connecticut's approach unusual. Other state constitutions also accord
reputation explicit textual protection, often by enumerating reputation along
with the more familiar "life, liberty, and property" interests set forth in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution.2 4'
236. See Frank Carr, The English Law of Defamation, 18 LAW Q. REv. 255 (1902).
237. See Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV.
546 (1903); see also R.C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99 (discussing the
history of defamation in the common law and noting that the common law of most states largely
incorporates prior English rules); Colin R. Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common
Law, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1962) (analyzing the English cases that created the law of defamation and
the reasons that supported its development). See generally MADISON, supra note 11 (describing a wide
variety of interests, including political and religious beliefs, as the "property" of the holder and arguing
that legitimate governments must both respect and protect such property).
238. 1 Conn. Pub. Acts 24 (1808) (emphasis added); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (establishing
liability for deprivation of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws"); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (finding that Congress, in enacting § 1983, "meant
to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's
abuse of his position").
239. See Robert I. Berdon, The Connecticut Constitution: An Analytical Framework for Raising
State Constitutional Claims in Connecticut, 14 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 191, 192-94 (1994); Christopher
Collier, The Connecticut Declarationof Rights Before the Constitutionof 1818: A Victim of Revolutionary Redefinition, 15 CONN. L. REv. 87, 91 n.14 (1982).

240. Berdon, supra note 239, at 205; see CONN. CONST.art. I, § 10.
241. See, e.g., TEx. CONSr. art. I, § 13 ("All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury
done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."); PA.
CONST. art I, § 1 ("All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and
indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
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For example, "[a]s early as 1855, the Texas Supreme Court unequivocally
recognized the fundamental nature of reputation rights.", 242 The Texas Supreme
Court explained that
[e]very man has a clear and indisputable legal right to be secure not only in
the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, but also in his reputation and
good name; and for every invasion of this right he has a legal claim to redress
by a civil action. He has a right to be protected from defamation of his
character, which rests upon 24
as3solid a foundation as his right to be protected in
his person and his property.

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's announcement in Paul v. Davis that the
procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause does not protect reputation, 2 44
"[p]ersons whose reputations are threatened should rightfully expect at least as
much protection from a Texas [state] court as they would have received in
24 5
federal court before Paul v. Davis."
In addition, in the absence of an express textual reference to reputation in
their state constitutions, some state supreme courts have interpreted their state
constitutions' due process clauses to protect reputation as an aspect of "property" or "liberty.", 24 6 For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the state constitution's due process clause protected substantive common law
rights-including those protecting property-from legislative abridgment.24 7
possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness."); cf U.S.
CONST. amends. V, XIV (protecting "life, liberty, and property" interests from abridgment absent "due
process of law"). Many state constitutions contain clauses that guarantee a "right to a remedy." See
Neil H. Cogan, Moses and Modernism, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 1347, 1362-63 (1994) (stating that "most"
state constitutions guarantee a right to a remedy); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1197, 1201 n.25 (1992) (listing the 39 states that guarantee a right to a remedy); see also IND.
CONST. art. I, § 12 ("All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."). State supreme courts have
interpreted these clauses in a variety of ways. See Schuman, supra, at 1203-17. Although state
constitutional guarantees of a fight to a remedy may be interpreted as supplemental to the protection of
property interests afforded by the federal substantive due process right, such state law rights do not
displace such federal rights.
242. David Richards & Chris Riley, Developing a Coherent Due-Course-of-Law Doctrine, 68 TEx.
L. REV. 1649, 1658 (1990).
243. Yarborough v. Tate, 14 Tex. 483, 486 (1855).
244. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-99, 711-12 (1976).
245. Richards & Riley, supra note 242, at 1658-59.
246. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Item Co., 34 So. 2d 886, 890 (La. 1948) (stating that "[a] man's
reputation is recognized to be as invaluable.., as his right to due process of law in the protection of his
life, liberty, and property"); see also Richard P. Bullock" Comment, The Declarationof Rights of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974: The Louisiana Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 51 LA. L. REV. 787,
790-92, 794 n.32 (1991) (arguing that Louisiana constitution provides broader rights than may be
asserted in federal courts).
247. See Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 87-89 (1805); see also Robert E.
Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941, 981-84 (discussing the North Carolina
Supreme Court's interpretation of the "law-of-the-land" clause in the state constitution as barring the
legislature from depriving corporations and individuals of their property without due process of law);
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Moreover, North Carolina's use of substantive due process to protect preexisting common law property rights, presumably including reputation, is not
unique; numerous other state supreme courts have adopted this expansive
construction of due process. 24 8
Finally, unlike the Supreme Court's liberty-based doctrine of substantive due
process, most state constitutions give equal treatment to property interests. For
example, over twenty-one states expressly guarantee the right to protect one's
property and eighteen of these states describe the right as "inalienable," while
two others deem the right "inherent.", 249 Thus, the right to one's reputation is a

basic property right in the American legal system. Certainly, it has a much
cleaner historical pedigree than many liberty interests recognized by the Sua poll
preme Court, such as the right to marry, the right to vote without paying
250
tax, the right to use birth control, or the right to terminate a pregnancy.
2. Reputation in a More Generalized Context
Although the historical practices of the states serve as a sure guide to
identifying fundamental rights,2 5' contemporary attitudes toward the value of a
particular interest, such as reputation, are also relevant in determining the
constitutional status of the interest. 252 A number of legal scholars, whose works
Michael W. Dowdle, Note, The Descent of Antidiscrimination: On the Intellectual Origins of the
Current Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1184-87 (1991) (same). For a
discussion of the Foy decision, see Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the
Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 380-84 (1911) (arguing that Foy should be viewed as one of the
nation's first substantive due process cases). See generally Louis D. Bilionis, Liberty, "The Law of the
Land," and Abortion in North Carolina, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1839, 1845-52 (1993) (describing the North
Carolina Supreme Court's activist cast and its mandate to use judicial review to enforce and protect
"the law of the land" from legislative encroachments).
248. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREkTISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 351-59 (1890); see also FRANK R.
STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1-18, 30-40 (1986) (describing historical interpretations of
relation of "due process" to property rights); Riggs, supra note 247, at 981-84; Dowdle, supra note
247, at 1185-86, 1186 n.128; cf. Corwin, supra note 247, at 375-80 (noting state supreme courts'
judicial self-restraint in several early cases involving claims under unenumerated due process rights).
249. See Lauri Alsup, The Right to Protect Property, 21 ENVTL. L. 209, 213-14 (1991) (citing and
quoting various state constitutions).
250. See Edward G. Spitko, Note, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia 's Approach to Fundamental
Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1356-59 (describing the Supreme Court's decisions to
uphold a mental patient's right to liberty and an interracial couple's right to marry as contrary to
tradition); see also ELY, supra note 26, at 60-63 (noting the utility of tradition as a touchstone for
recognizing constitutional rights but questioning tradition's reliability in light of the indeterminacy
problem); Bork, supra note 26, at 7-11 (describing and criticizing the Supreme Court's recognition of
nontextual fundamental rights).
251. See infra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
252. In the context of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has stated that
"contemporary social attitudes" are highly relevant to determining whether a particular punishment is
"cruel and unusual." See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 171-73 (1976); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 353 (1910). Likewise, contemporary
attitudes toward particular liberty interests undeniably have shaped the Supreme Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992)
(plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); cf.Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
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range from standard law review articles to more esoteric jurisprudential musings, confirm the importance of both property generally, and reputation specifically, in contemporary American society.
In his seminal analysis of a new class of entitlement-based property interests,
Professor Charles Reich argued that property is central to the construction of
being: "[I]n a society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to
control a particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of individuality. '' 253 In essence, the possession and exercise of property rights both define
us and permit us to be self-defining. As Professor William Van Alstyne has
noted, "The rightness of this view is scarcely contestable from the perspective
of our own Constitution, enshrining as it does property as equal in importance
with life and with liberty, of which no person shall be deprived without due
254
process of law.",
The generalized importance of property interests under the Constitution is
also relevant to evaluating the weight of particular property interests. For
example, those property interests most closely associated with individual autonomy-i.e., property interests that facilitate the meaningful exercise of liberty
interests-are central to who we are and what we aspire to be and thus deserve
more than a modicum of solicitude.2 55 Viewed this way, reputation should rank
first among property interests because it constitutes an essential property--one

195-96 (1986) (finding that majority belief that homosexuality is immoral is an adequate state
justification for legislative proscriptions against sodomy).
253. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
254. Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 453. By way of comparison, the Japanese Constitution of
1947-the individual rights and liberties provisions of which were consciously modeled on the United
States Constitution-does not include property in its version of the Due Process Clause. See KENP6 ch.
III, art. 31 ("No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be
imposed, except according to procedure established by law."). Professor Nobushige Ukai has explained
that this omission was quite deliberate: "This Article [31] makes it clear that restrictions on property
should be considered separately from questions about due process of law, thus precluding Japan from
the difficulties encountered in the United States when the Supreme Court declared that an early child
labor law was unconstitutional." Nobushige Ukai, The Significance of the Reception of American
ConstitutionalInstitutions and Ideas in Japan, in CONSTTUTIONALISM IN ASIA 114, 121 (Lawrence W.
Beer ed., 1979); see also Akira Osuka, Welfare Rights, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 15-16 (1990).
This conscious decision to exclude property from the Japanese version of the Due Process Clause-a
decision made in part by American lawyers in the aftermath of World War II-says something
important about its American progenitor: even in the post-Lochner era, one could not logically read the
protection of property out of the Due Process Clause, either as a matter of procedural or substantive due
process. Accordingly, the American drafters of Article 31 simply omitted "property" from the text of
the Japanese due process clause.
255. Cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (plurality opinion) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."). There
is no principled reason to afford such protection to liberty interests while withholding it from equally
fundamental property interests. Nor, for that matter, should litigants be required to engage in semantic
gymnastics to force every important personal matter into the rubric of "liberty." Indeed, if one accepts
the basic thesis of this article, whether a particular interest constitutes liberty or property would be
largely irrelevant for purposes of determining the applicability of substantive due process; courts would
instead focus on the nature and quality of the asserted interest in order to determine whether it is
incommensurable and, therefore, fundamental. See supra text accompanying notes 182-217.
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that serves to define us to others in our community perhaps more than any other.
One should also consider the centrality of particular property interests to the
nation's project of democratic self-governance. Like liberty, property facilitates
by
democratic self-governance both directly and indirectly: it does so directly
256 accountability
enforcing
of
means
a
creating
dispersing power-thereby
and indirectly by facilitating the exercise of other liberties.25 7 The protection of
reputation is essential to democratic self-governance because it protects individual voice-the very ability to participate meaningfully in the marketplace of
ideas. The ability of one citizen to destroy another citizen's reputation with
impunity through the use of lies is the ability to silence dissent or unpopular
points of view. Similarly, permitting a government official to defame individual
citizens is fundamentally inconsistent with maintaining a viable participatory
democracy.
Several contemporary trends confirm that reputation should be regarded as a
fundamental property interest. Over a decade ago, Professor Rodney Smolla
observed that "an astonishing shift in cultural and legal conditions has caused a
dramatic proliferation of highly publicized libel actions brought by well-known
figures who seek, and often receive, staggering sums of money.", 258 He posited
that one of the contributing factors for this phenomenon was "a new legal and
cultural seriousness about the inner self,", 259 and contended that "the rejuvenafelt cultural
tion of the law of defamation is in part the result of strongly
260
well-being."
psychic
protecting
of
importance
the
attitudes about
256. See Rose, supra note 5, at 340-45; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9
(1962).
257. For example, a free press is simply not possible in the absence of secure property rights.
258. Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1983).
259. Id. at 11.
260. Id. at 17. Professor Smolla would probably reject my attempt to characterize reputation as a
"property" interest: "[I]t
seems clear that the bulk of the money paid out in damage awards in
defamation suits is to compensate for psychic injury, rather than to compensate for any objectively
verifiable damage to one's community standing." Id. at 19. This description of jury awards in
defamation cases arguably describes the rationale for granting damages in cases alleging the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. One could argue, however, that defamation protects the economic value
of reputation-a value that is quantifiable in at least some circumstances. For example, suppose that a
sheriff calls a press conference and announces that a local pediatrician is a pedophile. Further assume
that the charge is baseless and reflects nothing more than a personal vendetta by the sheriff against the
doctor. It is highly doubtful that the defamed pediatrician will be able to maintain his practice; even if
he succeeds in prosecuting a defamation action and overcoming official immunity protection for the
sheriff's statement in the process, a nontrivial portion of the community will refuse to believe that the
sheriff's statement is a lie. In all probability, the pediatrician will have to relocate and rebuild his
practice in some distant community. This loss of goodwill has a quantifiable economic value, and the
tort of defamation provides the vehicle for recovering this value. In short, whether the pediatrician
suffers "psychic" injury seems less relevant to the quantification of damages than whether his practice
has been adversely affected. That said, Professor Smolla's suggestion that defamation plaintiffs use the
tort to obtain "a forum for an official declaration that the attack on the victim was undeserved"
certainly rings true. Id.; see also Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74
CAL. L. REv. 743, 744-45 (1986) (citing research data supporting the assertion that most defamation
plaintiffs "win by suing" rather than "sue to win").
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Professor Smolla's observations about the new salience of defamation law
supports the assertion that reputation is fundamental. The importance of reputation in contemporary American society is demonstrated by the increasing
number of Americans who seek to protect their reputations through recourse to
the common law.
Even if one grants the fundamental nature of reputation as a general matter,
the task of classifying it as a "liberty" or "property" interest still remains. 26 1 If
defamation exists principally to protect the psyche, reputation is more akin to a
liberty interest-for example, the right to be free from a particular distraction. If
one focuses on a defamatory statement's economic impact, however, and on the
common law's willingness to provide a remedy only for that economic injury
and for no other harms, psychic or otherwise, reputation seems more akin to a
2 62
property interest.
Professor Robert Post has posited that reputation exists as three separate and
identifiable interests: reputation as property, reputation as honor, and reputation
as dignity.263 He acknowledges that "[t]he concept of reputation that is most
easily available to contemporary observers is that of reputation in the marketplace.", 264 Under this paradigm, reputation "can be understood as a form of
intangible property akin to goodwill. ' 265 This conception of reputation enjoys
the blessing of history.26 6 As Post notes, "The concept of reputation as property
is so deeply embedded in our understanding of defamation law that a prominent
nineteenth century writer could conclude that in defamation law the protection
267
is to the property, and not to the reputation.9
According to Post, classifying reputation as property "create[s] a powerful
and internally coherent account of defamation law.", 268 He notes, however, that
some aspects of libel law, such as per se libels, limitations on recoveries for
defamatory statements, and assorted oddities of damages jurisprudence demonstrate that reputation is something more (and perhaps something less) than mere
property. 269 Thus, he goes on to posit that conceptualizing reputation as "honor"
or "dignity" may help to account for these quirks.27 °

261. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707, 1734 n.116 (1993).
262. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 479 n.97.
263. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 692-93 (1986).
264. Id. at 693.
265. Id. (citation omitted).
266. See id. at 694-96; see also THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL,
SCANDALUM MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMOURS xx (New York, G. Lamson 1826) (stating that reputational concerns "connect themselves with credit and character, affixing to them a value, not merely
ideal, but capable of pecuniary admeasurement, and consequently recommending them as the proper
objects of legal protection").
267. Post, supra note 263, at 696 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Id.; see Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 479 n.97 (arguing that reputation could quite reasonably
be denominated a property interest).
269. Post, supra note 263, at 697-99.
270. See id. at 703-07, 712-19, 720.
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For purposes of applying the Due Process Clause, it makes sense to conceptualize reputation as property; as Post acknowledges, this account has the imprimatur of history and tradition. 27 ' As another commentator has explained:
It is in the context of a career that reputation seems most like an individual
possession. For in a career one's greatest asset is one's self, and what people
think of one has a crucial bearing on one's success. One's skill, one's probity,
one's character, are crucial resources in climbing the escalator of advancement in American society. Anything that would cast doubt on one's reputation
in these spheres would, therefore, be directly harmful to one's life chances. 272
Given its strongly economic cast, reputation is quite reasonably characterized as
a "property" interest for substantive due process purposes.27 3
Finally, although I prefer to conceptualize reputation (like bodily integrity) as
a property interest, if one accepts my central thesis that substantive due process
should protect both property and liberty interests, the importance of labelling a
given interest as "property" or "liberty" falls away: regardless of how one
describes the interest, substantive due process protection applies. Rather than
focusing on the characterization of a particular interest as liberty or property,
courts would instead attempt to ascertain the importance of the particular
interest in order to decide whether to apply strict scrutiny or rational basis
review. 274 In order to choose between the two standards of review, the reviewing court would have to determine whether a particular interest is "fundamental."
B. PAUL V. DAVIS: REPUTATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST

In Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that reputation,
standing alone, enjoys protection under the procedural aspect of the Due
Process Clause. Paul could also be read to preclude substantive due process
protection of reputation as a property interest. If read broadly to prohibit both
substantive and procedural due process protection of reputation, Paul constitutes a major impediment to the recognition of reputation as a fundamental

271. Id. at 693-95.
272. Bellah, supra note 260, at 744.
273. Of course, this is not to say that reputation does not also incorporate noneconomic interests. See
id. at 744-45; Harris, supra note 261, at 1725-28, 1734-36 (arguing that courts have routinely used
defamation law to protect myriad economic interests associated with reputation); Post, supra note 263,
at 695-97, 720; Smolla, supra note 258, at 17-19.
274. Prior to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), the Supreme Court had demonstrated a willingness to consider the importance of the interest to
the individual rather than its status as "property" or "liberty" for purposes of procedural due process
protection. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that a driver's license, whether
characterized properly as liberty or property, constituted a protected interest for purposes of procedural
due process). Provided that a particular interest arguably constitutes either liberty or property, due
process protections-both procedural and substantive-should attach.
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property interest. In the discussion that follows, I explain why the better
approach is to read Paul more narrowly. In addition, I examine whether Paul
addresses the status of reputation as a liberty interest, a property interest, or
both.
The facts of the case are compelling. Paul, the chief of the Louisville,
Kentucky police department, printed and distributed flyers that listed Edward
Davis as an "active shoplifter. ' ' 275 Paul included Davis on this list because he
had been arrested for shoplifting; however, Davis had not been tried for-much
less convicted of-shoplifting.2 7 6 Davis claimed that Paul's behavior deprived
277
him of liberty without due process of law.
Relying on the Supreme Court's then-recent precedent in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,278 Davis argued that Paul had an obligation to provide him with meaning279
ful predeprivation process before posting his name as an "active shoplifter."
The Sixth Circuit agreed that Constantineaugoverned the case and reversed the
280
district court's dismissal of the claim.
Davis's reliance on Constantineauproved misplaced, however. Writing for
the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist explained that "[t]he words 'liberty' and
'property' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment do not in terms single out
reputation as a candidate for special protection over and above other interests
that may be protected by state law.", 28' Fearing that any alternative holding
"would make ... the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever system may already be administered by the States,"
Justice Rehnquist refused to require the state to provide process before depriving a person of his good name.2 82
Indeed, according to Justice Rehnquist, Davis had no protected interest in his
reputation. Instead, Davis's "interest in reputation is simply one of a number
which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a
forum for vindication of those interests by means of damages actions., 283 He
concluded his procedural due process analysis by explaining that "the interest
in reputation asserted in this case is neither 'liberty' nor 'property' guaranteed

275. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695-96 (1976).
276. Id.; see also id. at 718-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing in detail the circumstances and
testimony pertaining to respondent's inclusion on the list of known shoplifters).
277. Id. at 697.
278. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). In Constantineau,the Supreme Court held that "[wihere a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Id. at 437. From Davis's perspective, his case fit nicely
within the Constantineau framework: Paul's assertion that he was an "active shoplifter" plainly
damaged his reputation, giving him a right to demand predeprivation process.
279. Paul,424 U.S. at 697-98.
280. Id. at 696-99.
281. Id. at 701.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 712; cf Haines, supra note 213, at 217-23 (describing the emphasis that the Supreme
Court had placed on reputation in pre-Paulprocedural due process cases).
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284
against state deprivation without due process of law.",
Notwithstanding this unqualified language, the Paul Court was addressing
due process protection of reputation only as a matter of procedural due process. 85 All of the precedents cited in the majority's opinion, including Constantineau, sound only in procedural, not substantive, due process. 286 Moreover, in a
footnote, Justice Rehnquist specifically limited the Paul holding to "procedural
due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause.", 2 87 Accordingly, after Paul,
the status of reputation as a matter of substantive due process remained open.2 88

1. The Academy's Reaction to Paul
Scholarly reaction to Paul was highly critical.28 9 Professor Henry Monaghan
authored what some regard as the most influential work on the case. 290 Although Professor Monaghan expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of the
decision, his critique focuses largely on the substantive, rather than the procedural, due process aspects of the case:
Taken at face value, Paul would radically reorient thinking about the nature of
the "liberty" protected by the due process clause. The case's rationale would
confine the federal content of "liberty" to specific constitutional guarantees
and to the Roe right of privacy, and, perhaps, to the Framers' understanding of
liberty as freedom from personal restraint. 2 9'

284. Paul, 424 U.S. at 712.
285. It is also curious that Justice Rehnquist purported to decide the case on both liberty and
property grounds, given that Davis only alleged a liberty interest in his reputation. Compare id. at 697
(Davis alleged that the state "deprived him of some 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"
under Constantineau) with id. at 701, 712 (purporting to decide whether procedural due process
protects reputation either as a "liberty" or "property" interest). Thus, Justice Rehnquist was painting
with a broader brush than was necessary to dispose of the case at bar.
286. See id. at 702-09.
287. Id. at 710-11 n.5.
288. Cf. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-35 (1991) (holding that no Bivens action exists for
damage to reputation). Siegert precludes recognition of a constitutionally guaranteed liberty interest in
reputation. See id. However, it does not speak to whether a would-be Bivens plaintiff has a cognizable
property interest in reputation; in fact, Siegert characterizes Paul as solely a liberty decision. See id.
Full recognition of reputation as a constitutionally protected property interest would require that the
Supreme Court either limit Siegert to instances in which an adequate state law tort remedy exists and is
available to the plaintiff or overrule the decision completely.
289. See George C. Christie, Injury to Reputation and Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting
Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43, 59-63 (1976); Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62
CORNELL L. REV. 405, 423-29 (1977); David L. Shapiro, Mr Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90
HARv. L. REV.293, 324-28 (1976); Mark Tushnet, The ConstitutionalRight to One's Good Name: An
Examination of the Scholarship of Mr Justice Rehnquist, 64 KY. L.J. 753, 753-54, 763-65 (1976);
Haines, supra note 213, at 203-09; Thomas J. Stalzer, Note, Reputation as a Constitutionally Protectible Interest, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 290, 291-92, 296-99 (1976).
290. See Monaghan, supra note 289, at 423-34; see also Gerald L. Neuman, Law Review Articles
That Backfire, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 697, 697-706 (1988) (describing Professor Monaghan's influential
article and the federal courts' mixed efforts to incorporate the ideas therein).
291. Monaghan, supra note 289, at 424.
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Professor Monaghan's reference to Roe v. Wade292 demonstrates that his principal concern is not whether Davis received constitutionally adequate process
prior to being branded an "active shoplifter," but whether reputation-standing
alone-is a "fundamental" interest. 293 Neither Paul nor Constantineau addresses whether substantive due process protects reputation. In this respect,
Professor Monaghan was comparing apples to oranges. 9 4
Although Professor Monaghan later acknowledged that Paul spoke only to
procedural, not substantive, due process, 295 he nonetheless predicted that the
Court would later apply Paul's holding to a substantive due process claim
involving the protection of reputation.29 6 There is good reason to question this
conclusion in light of Parrattv. Taylor,29 7 Zinermon v. Burch,29 8 and Albright v.
Oliver,299 all of which suggest that a different analysis should apply in cases
involving substantive due process claims.
Professor Monaghan's broad reading of Paul presupposes that a state is free
to leave its citizens at the mercy of arbitrary officials, bent on spreading the
most vicious lies and falsehoods. He notes that "in a 'Constitution for a free
people,' it is an unsettling conception of liberty that protects an individual
against state interference with his access to liquor but not with his reputation in
the community."' 30 0 Professor Monaghan goes on to suggest that "[t]he more
reprehensible and subject to legal redress the conduct, the freer the state is to
engage in it-at least until that conduct bumps up against some specific
constitutional guarantee or the hodgepodge right of privacy.", 3 0 If Paul worked
the mischief that Professor Monaghan describes, it would indeed be a terrible
case of mammoth proportions. However, Paul's holding is far less sweeping
than Professor Monaghan suggests; it certainly does not mean that the states are
free to abridge fundamental interests.
Because of Constantineau, Davis was content to litigate his claim under the

292. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
293. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
294. Professor Monaghan seems to have recognized this defect in his reasoning. In a subsequent
article, he specifically exempted cases involving "fundamental" rights from the scope of the Parrattv.
Taylor line of cases, which limit a plaintiffs ability to assert certain procedural due process claims in
the federal courts by denying the existence of cognizable "property" or "liberty" interests when the
alleged deprivation is not the result of official state law or policy. See Henry P. Monaghan, State Law
Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 984-86, 990-94
(1986).
295. Monaghan, supra note 289, at 431-33.
296. Id.
297. In Parratt,a prisoner claimed that the state violated his procedural due process rights when a
prison guard destroyed a hobby kit worth $23.50 without providing predeprivation process. Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529-31 (1981). Parratt and subsequent cases hold that the availability of an
adequate postdeprivation remedy generally satisfies the requirements of procedural due process when
the conduct at issue is random or unauthorized. See id. at 530-31, 537-44.
298. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
299. 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality opinion).
300. Monaghan, supra note 289, at 426 (citation omitted).
301. Id. at 427.
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"procedural" aspect of the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court could not properly speak to the larger questions that a substantive due
process claim might raise. In all probability, of course, Justice Rehnquist would
have liked to close the federal courthouse door to both substantive and procedural due process claims that seek to establish a property or liberty interest in
reputation. However, his chosen vehicle could not, and does not, support such
an analytical move.3 °2
In a subsequent case, Siegert v. Gilley,3 °3 the Supreme Court held (in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist) that no Bivens action would lie for damage
to reputation because there is no constitutionally cognizable liberty interest in
reputation. 3° Siegert does what Paul did not: it forecloses the existence of a
substantive due process liberty interest in reputation. However, Siegert still did
not address whether a substantive due process property interest in reputation
exists and, like Paul, seemed to assume that adequate state law tort remedies are
readily available.30 5
2. State Remedies and Federal Rights
Paul seems to presuppose the availability of postdeprivation redress through
the state tort system but fails to specify whether the state could abridge Davis's
interest in his reputation without providing any meaningful postdeprivation
process.30 6 This interpretation of Paul comports with Parrattv. Taylor, which
holds that a procedural due process claim will not lie for a negligent deprivation
of a property interest. 30 7 As a matter of procedural due process, a postdepriva308
tion remedy sufficiently protects both property and liberty interests. Parratt's
scope, however, is limited to procedural due process claims; it does not encompass those claims brought under substantive due process. 30 9
Thus, the majority opinion in Paul, odious though it may be, does not permit
the state to leave the individual without any remedy for the defamatory statements of capricious state officers. Rather, when placed in the context of the
Parrattline of cases, it would seem to hold only that a tort action for damages
following a public officer's defamatory act satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. 310 The opinion simply does not speak to a state's freedom to
define the law of defamation or to the possible application of the doctrine of

302. See Paul,424 U.S. at 710-11 n.5.
303. 500 U.S. 226(1991).
304. Id. at 233-35.
305. See id.
306. Paul, 424 U.S. at 697, 711-13; see also Haines, supra note 213, at 204 & n.88 (noting the
Court's silence in Paul regarding the possibility of an absolute or qualified privilege in defamation suits
against government officials).
307. Parratt,451 U.S. at 543-44.
308. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701
(1977).
309. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125; see Nahmod, supra note 172, at 225-29.
310. See Nahmod, supra note 172, at 225-34; Shapiro, supra note 289, at 324-25.
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official immunity to such actions as a means of denying an effective recovery.
Nor, strictly speaking, does the opinion address whether a state may permit an
officer or agency to defame citizens as a matter of official policy. Accordingly, it
is still possible to argue that a state violates substantive due process when it
3
infringes upon an individual citizen's reputation or permits others to do S 1'.
Paul merely precludes the use of procedural due process as a means of
challenging such state behavior.3' 2
As a practical matter, Paul forces would-be litigants to challenge the adequacy of the state's common law of defamation when such law precludes
recovery. Moreover, a would-be plaintiff might mount a substantive due process
challenge to a state's law of official immunity when that doctrine would
preclude recovery against a government official for a defamatory statement.
Alternatively, a would-be plaintiff could attempt to show that the state's behavior was so egregious that it constituted an independent constitutional wrong.3 ' 3
This approach is eminently reasonable: a state may provide adequate process
even though its substantive law unduly burdens a fundamental right; 31 4 notwith311. See Tushnet, supra note 289, at 758 (suggesting that whether state has discretionary power or
constitutionally mandated obligation to confer right to good name by adopting defamation laws,
plaintiff in Paul had stated a constitutional claim). The Supreme Court removed any doubt about this
point in a recent case involving a substantive due process claim arising from a wrongful prosecution.
See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 282-84 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); infra Part IVA. Further
confirmation comes from Parrattv. Taylor, in which Justice Rehnquist-again writing for the majorityrelied on Paul to support the proposition that an adequate postdeprivation state remedy precluded a
procedural due process claim for the conduct at issue. Parratt,451 U.S. at 543-44. Two concurring
Justices specifically distinguished substantive due process claims from the claim at issue in Parratt.See
id. at 545-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe that there are certain governmental
actions that, even if undertaken with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of-themselves,
antithetical to fundamental notions of due process." (citations omitted)); id. at 552-53 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("The Due Process Clause imposes substantive limitations on state action and under proper
circumstances these limitations may extend to intentional and malicious deprivations of liberty and
property, even where compensation is available under state law." (citations omitted)). Justice White
joined Justice Blackmun's concurrence, id. at 545, and Justice Stewart authored a separate concurrence
that emphasized the procedural due process nature of the claim at issue. Id. at 544-45 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall did not join the majority's opinion because he did not believe that state
law provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Id. at 554-56 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Thus, five Justices voted that substantive due process might apply in cases like
Parratt,in which no procedural due process claim would lie.
312. This conclusion is certainly defensible, leaving aside the propriety of overruling sub silentio the
early precedent in Constantineau. If the state provides adequate postdeprivation process, a defamed
person is presumably not denied procedural due process. Moreover, most instances of defamation will
occur on an ad hoc basis and not pursuant to an official policy; it is the offhand remark to the reporter,
rather than the official policy of the state, that is likely to cause problems. Consequently, relying on
postdeprivation process is not an inherently irrational approach. Applying Mathews v. Eldridge balancing, however, it is doubtful that the instances of state-sponsored defamation would be reduced if
predeprivation process is provided. The real question is whether the Constitution permits a state to
defame an individual citizen without providing a means of making the defamed individual whole. This
question relates not to procedural due process, but rather to substantive due process.
313. See Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994). Such an argument could be premised
on a substantive interest in fair treatment by the government: a "due process" interest in due process
itself. See infra notes 425-36 and accompanying text.
314. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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standing the adequacy of the process provided, the state also may act arbitrarily
or irrationally to deprive a citizen of a property or liberty interest.3 15 Paul does
not preclude a substantive due process attack either to the deprivation of a
fundamental property or liberty interest or as a means of attacking wholly
irrational govemmental behavior.3 16
3. The Existence of a Freestanding Federal Remedy in the Absence of an
Adequate State Remedy
Justice Kennedy recently has suggested that states have a constitutional obligation
to respect "some of the interests granted historical protection by the common law of
torts," 3 17 citing "the interests in freedom from defamation and malicious prosecution"
as examples of such interests. 8 Indeed, the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Albright v. Oliver suggest that a majority of the Court might reconsider whether the
the
states retain plenary authority to reshape the law of torts to deny or limit
3 19
protection traditionally afforded certain interests under the common law.
Thus, Paul's premise that the Constitution must not serve as a "font of tort
law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by
the States" ' 320 may no longer command a majority of the Court. 32' If so, the
Court should articulate a coherent theory of substantive due process that
justifies federal court supervision of state substantive tort, contract, and property
law-areas of state law that have historically been largely, if not exclusively, the
province of the states since the New Deal.32 2
315. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407-10 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
316. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
317. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 282 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
318. Id.
319. See infra notes 380-405 and accompanying text; see also BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589,
1598-1604 (1996) (using Due Process Clause to limit punitive damages award in state tort law suit).
See generally Tushnet, supra note 289, at 758 & n.24.
320. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
321. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent decision in BMW v. Gore demonstrates the Court's
willingness to use the Due Process Clause as a means of policing state tort law, at least insofar as
punitive damage awards are concerned. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1592. In Gore, the Supreme Court held that
a $2 million punitive damages award was "grossly excessive" and therefore violated BMW's substantive due process rights. Id. at 1604. But see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 470-72 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Supreme Court's supervision of punitive
damage awards in state tort law constitutes an undesirable resurrection of substantive due process for
economic rights). Just as substantive due process limits a state's ability to create tort remedies, it should
(logically) also circumscribe their ability to abolish such remedies. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 284-85 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Parratdoctrine represents an appropriate balance between state autonomy and
federal court enforcement of federal constitutional rights and noting that the states do not posses unbridled
discretion to abolish "interests granted protection by the common law of torts"); see also Haines, supra note
213, at 206 (arguing that § 1983, which was intended to protect federal constitutional interests from state
abridgment, requires federal courts to invalidate unduly restrictive state tort laws).
322. See Currie, supra note 34, at 507-16 (tracing evolution of substantive due process jurisprudence
during 1930s); Phillips, supra note 34, at 269-85, 289 (providing an overview of Supreme Court
substantive due process jurisprudence from Lochner era to present).
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C. REPUTATION, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND CONFLICTS WITH OTHER
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

Before accepting my argument that reputation constitutes a fundamental
property interest that the federal courts should safeguard under the doctrine of
substantive due process, one might reasonably inquire about the ramifications of
such a doctrinal shift for well-settled First Amendment law. Specifically, such a
theory seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's First Amendment holdings
323
regarding the permissible scope of state defamation law.
It is true that the Court has severely limited the states' ability to permit tort
recoveries against newspapers, broadcasters, and other members of the Fourth
Estate.32 4 However, even after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 25 the states
ostensibly "retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy
326
for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual.,
Thus, recognizing a fundamental property interest in reputation would simply
limit the states' ability to go beyond the dictates of Sullivan and subsequent
cases in protecting the First Amendment prerogatives of the press. That is, the
states could not abolish or otherwise restrict recoveries for defamation more
than is required by the Supreme Court's First Amendment guidelines.32 7
A second potential hurdle posed by substantive due process protection of
property rights (including reputation) is the recent trend toward expanding the
Takings Clause to encompass an ever broader universe of property interests.3 2 8
Dean Richard Epstein has suggested that either the Takings Clause or the
Contracts Clause should serve as a basis for the expanded protection of property

323. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
324. For a detailed description of the Supreme Court's First Amendment supervision of state
defamation law, see Smolla, supra note 258, at 47-63; see also Post, supra note 226, at 626-39 (tracing
the interplay of notions of "public discourse" and "community standards" in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence).
325. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
326. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323. 345-46 (1974).
327. For example, a state could not require all plaintiffs to establish malice as a prerequisite to
recovering compensatory damages for a slander. See id. at 346-50 (permitting states to choose any
fault-based standard of liability to govern defamation actions brought by nonpublic figures but
prohibiting the imposition of exemplary damages in the absence of a showing of actual malice). As a
matter of federal constitutional law, a nonpublic figure suing a nonmedia defendant should enjoy the
right to recover for a defamatory statement under a less onerous standard of liability than the Sullivan
"actual malice" standard. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
328. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) ("One of the principal purposes of the
Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' " (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))); Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320-24 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (holding that because the Takings Clause provides explicit textual source against private takings,
the Fifth Amendment, rather than a "more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' " must be
the basis for reviewing private takings claims (citations omitted)). In addition, Chief Judge Richard
Posner and Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit have indicated that they support this
doctrinal trend. See Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d 654, 657-59 (7th Cir. 1995); Gamble v. Eau Claire
County, 5 F.3d 285, 286-88 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1129 (1994).
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interests, 329 and his efforts to reshape the legal landscape have not been in vain.
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has significantly strengthened its
"regulatory takings" jurisprudence. 330 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit recently
interpreted the scope of the Takings Clause to encompass nonpublic takings,
principally to avoid creating a doctrine of substantive due process protection for
economic and property interests.3 3 ' In light of these scholarly and judicial
pronouncements, one might reasonably question whether anything would be
gained by expanding substantive due process to reach fundamental property
interests; after all, if the Takings and the Contracts Clauses specifically protect
economic interests, nothing can be gained by recognizing a nontextual substantive due process right.332 There are several problems with this analysis, the most
obvious being that neither the Takings Clause nor the Contracts Clause can bear
the full weight of protecting property interests unless they are torn loose from
their textual moorings.
The Takings Clause provides protection for official government takings of
cognizable property interests only when such takings facilitate a public purpose.
To apply the Takings Clause to a government action without a public purpose is
to read the "public purpose" limitation entirely out of the clause.33 3
In addition, the Takings Clause does not speak to prospective changes in the
law that result in a diminution of future, as yet inchoate, property interests. For
example, if a state legislature placed a $500,000 cap on damages awards for
'defamation actions, no "taking" occurs because there is no property interest
until a cause accrues; a person defamed after the damages cap becomes law did
not suffer a taking when the legislation was enacted.
The Contracts Clause prohibits states from passing laws that impair preexisting contractual relationships. It says nothing about torts or generalized property
rights, however, nor does it prohibit prospective changes in the law of contracts,
torts, or property. To construe it as the font of a generalized right to enjoy one's
property free of irrational government action requires interpretivism of a very
high order.334
I find it difficult to discern the benefit of avoiding one kind of interpretivism
in order to engage in another. Moreover, the kind of interpretivism necessary to
329. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 279-80 (arguing that the Contracts Clause should be construed to
approximate the Supreme Court's old economic substantive due process jurisprudence); Epstein, supra
note 5, at 725-30 (same); see also Dowdle, supra note 247, at 1200 n.220 (arguing that the Takings
Clause has already replaced substantive due process as the Court's preferred method of safeguarding
property interests).
330. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-92; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-28.
331. See Annendariz, 75 F.3d at 1323-25 & n.8; see also supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
332. Moreover, if the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause provide comprehensive protection of
property and economic interests, the Supreme Court would presumably decline to endorse a freestanding substantive due process interest. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality
opinion) (holding that an explicit textual source of protection, rather than a generalized notion of due
process, should guide courts); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (same).
333. This is precisely what the Ninth Circuit did in Annendariz. See 75 F.3d at 1320-25.
334. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 716-17, 750-51.
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transform the Takings Clause or the Contracts Clause into a general guarantee
of property interests arguably extends well beyond interpretivism and constitutes a gross form of antitextualism. As a matter of sound constitutional
interpretation, it makes little sense to seek greater doctrinal clarity by creating
textual chaos. The Due Process Clause, which is notoriously vague, is a better
source to anchor a generalized right to enjoy one's property free of governmental intrusions. Indeed, the clause specifically speaks to "life, liberty, [and]
property" and therefore directly addresses the problem at hand.
Attempting to shoehorn all property interests into the Takings and Contracts
Clauses also creates a doctrinal asymmetry: the Supreme Court has never
attempted to fit various liberty interests into more specific clauses of the
Constitution. The right to reproductive choice, for example, could easily have
been located in the Fourth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause.
However, in both Roe and Casey, the Supreme Court was content to locate the
interest in the Due Process Clause. Because the clause provides generalized
protection of liberty interests, it cannot logically be read to provide no protection of property interests.
Finally, the concept of due process directly invokes a citizen's right to
demand rational governance. In some instances, when a particular interest is
incommensurable, rational governance means limited or no governance absent
compelling circumstances. This view of rational governance begets the notion
of "fundamental" rights and strict scrutiny review. Nonfundamental interests
are more readily subject to the commands of the state; procedural due process
speaks to the government's obligation to act rationally as a general matter when
any aspect of a citizen's life, liberty, or property is at stake. Regardless of the
nature of the interest at issue, due process also means that the government
cannot act lawlessly, recklessly, or arbitrarily. This last interest sounds in
substantive rather than procedural due process-it is the substantive interest in
process itself.
Neither the Takings Clause nor the Contracts Clause embodies or invokes the
right to rational governance. Instead, like the Third Amendment-which protects citizens from having to quarter troops-they are specific guarantees aimed
at providing relief in limited circumstances.
In sum, there is no reason to tear either the Takings Clause or the Contracts
Clause loose from its textual moorings in order to protect fundamental property
interests or to ensure minimally rational government behavior vis-A-vis nonfundamental property interests. The Due Process Clause can provide these protections and is textually well-suited to the task. Nor, for that matter, is substantive
due process protection of property interests duplicative of preexisting rights
under either the Takings Clause or the Contracts Clause. Cases will arise with
facts that do not implicate either the Takings Clause or the Contracts Clause, but
which involve government behavior that nonetheless cannot be countenanced.
In such circumstances, the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause should
serve as the principal means of seeking judicial redress.

608
III.
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OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS TO JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF FUNDAMENTAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS

As with substantive due process liberty claims, proponents of a new fundamental property rights jurisprudence must address the definitional difficulties associated with recognizing such rights. A skeptic might reasonably ask what property
rights are sufficiently "fundamental" to justify application of strict scrutiny
review. Moreover, the same critic might also demand some sort of analytic
framework that would permit citizens to determine easily and predictably
whether a particular property interest is "fundamental., 335 These questions have been
asked of proponents of the Supreme Court's fundamental liberties jurisprudence and
would be equally germane to a fundamental property rights jurisprudence.
A number of prominent legal scholars have defended the Supreme Court's
substantive due process protections of fundamental liberty interests,33 6 and
there would be little point in reiterating what others have already said (and often
said quite well 337 ). However, beyond providing a general defense of substantive
due process-a task that lies outside the scope of my project-there are a
number of discrete issues that are particularly relevant to the recognition of
fundamental property interests. Moreover, the principal objective of this article
is not to defend substantive due process generally, but rather to argue that if the
Supreme Court is committed to recognizing and protecting fundamental liberty
interests, it should treat fundamental property interests no less favorably.

335. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-32 (1989). Justice Scalia's proposed
solution to this problem is elegant in its simplicity: when determining whether a liberty interest is
fundamental, one must look to the narrowest relevant community tradition. Thus, rather than generalizing liberty claims and looking to the community's broader treatment of particular areas of human
behavior (for example, marriage and procreation), one must look to the most specific taboos and
prohibitions potentially on point. For a critique of this approach and its inconsistency with the Court's
prior substantive due process jurisprudence, see Spitko, supra note 250, at 1348-60; see also ELY, supra
note 26, at 60 (noting the difficulties associated with using tradition to delimit constitutional rights);
Bork, supra note 26, at 7, 9-11 (same).
336. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 104-05, 126-28 (1994); TRIBE, supra note 5, § 15-10,
at 1346-62; Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 664-66 (1980);
Michael J. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71
Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 419-25 (1977); J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, Constitutional
Protectionfor PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 569-79, 588-91, 603-08 (1977); cf Paul
Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1080-89 (1981) (noting the difficulties associated with a jurisprudence
of fundamental rights that rests entirely on atextual normative claims); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862-65 (1989) (rejecting the Court's recognition of nontextual
constitutional rights and arguing that a mix of textualism and originalism is the only legitimate
approach to judicial review of legislative enactments).
337. See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled,59
U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 381-91 (1992); Fallon, supra note 91, at 312-29; James E. Fleming, Constructing
the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REV. 211, 211-14 (1993); Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion,
and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 293-312 (1986);
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1057, 1059-71 (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of
Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 261, 273-86.
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IDENTIFYING FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY INTERESTS

As a baseline matter, the recognition of fundamental property rights should
be analytically similar to the recognition of fundamental liberty interests. Only
property interests that have been "granted historical protection by the common
law of torts (such as... defamation)" should enjoy heightened protection under
the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause.3 3 8 Stated differently, only
deprivation of those property interests that are implicit in the concept of ordered
339
property rights should trigger strict scrutiny review.
In the context of liberty interests, the Supreme Court has placed great reliance
on community tradition as the touchstone for assessing limits on the scope of
fundamental liberty interests. 340 The same frame of reference should also guide
the recognition of fundamental property rights-only those rights that have the
approval of history should be deemed "fundamental." As Justice Powell has
explained, there must be "[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process [that]
come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for the
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society.' ,,341 These seem to be reasonable limits on the scope of substantive
due process; history and tradition should be highly relevant to identifying
fundamental rights.34 2

Having generally defined the parameters of the right, the next step is to offer
a few examples of property interests that would qualify as "fundamental." The
easiest and most basic example of a fundamental property interest is a person's
physical body. Absent a compelling interest, the state should not be permitted to
interfere with a citizen's bodily integrity.34 3 Similarly, the state should not be
338. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 283 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
339. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (discussing rights that are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty").
340. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977); cf.E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic
Argument for Gay Essentialism-Determinism:Implicationsfor Equal Protection and Substantive Due
Process, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 571, 584-97 (1996) (describing and criticizing the Supreme Court's use of
tradition as a limitation on the recognition of substantive due process rights).
341. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
342. See Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 1435-41.
343. Mandatory vaccinations provide perhaps the best example of a compelling state interest that
might override this property interest in one's own body. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
33-35 (1905). More recently, California state courts have wrestled with whether citizens have a
property interest in their own internal organs (and in the genetic codes they contain). See Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); cf.Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249
Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1988) (deciding whether Moore possessed a property right in his cells), rev'd,
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). Although a majority of the California Supreme Court held that he did not
possess such an interest, the appellate judges at both the California Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals were deeply divided on this issue. The case generated a plethora of student notes, which
discuss the opinions in greater detail. See generally William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other
Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693
(1995); Bray, supra note 31; Jennifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 75 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1989). The Supreme Court will face a
similar issue during the October 1996 Term when it reviews two decisions that recognize a substantive
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permitted to leave a citizen without legal recourse for damage done to her body
by private parties; in short, the state cannot refuse to create or recognize a
property interest in physical integrity. Indeed, every state has statutory or
common law tort remedies that permit individual citizens to recover for physical
harms. Workers' compensation, the tort of battery, wrongful death statutes, and
similar remedies recognize and incorporate the fundamental property interest in
physical integrity.
Suppose, however, that a state decided to enact a program of tort reform that
limited compensatory damages in medical malpractice cases to a certain sumsay, $750,000. 3 4 4 A plaintiff with actual damages in excess of that amount
should enjoy a constitutional substantive due process right to collect full
compensatory damages.34 5 The reason is simple enough: citizens have a right to
expect that long-standing property rights-just like long-standing liberty rightswill not be abrogated by the state absent a compelling state interest. Thus, the
recognition of a fundamental property right in this instance vindicates a longstanding cultural expectation.
Reputation provides a second example. If history and tradition are to serve as
the touchstones for identifying interests suitable for substantive due process
protection-and the Supreme Court repeatedly has asserted that they are-the
right to one's reputation must be deemed a "fundamental" property interest and
accorded appropriate substantive due process protection. 346 Simply put, one's
interest in reputation easily satisfies the Supreme Court's historical coda for
demonstrating that a particular liberty interest is "fundamental": the right to
due process interest in physician-assisted suicide. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); Quill v.
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996); see also supra note 31.
344. The hypothetical is not terribly far-fetched-in fact, it is not even a hypothetical. See IND. CODE
§ 27-12-14-3(a) (1993). Moreover, innumerable "tort-reform" projects are currently being debated at
both the state and federal levels and various state legislatures already have adopted tort reform
legislation. See Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1765, 1765, 1768-70 (1996); see also BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct 1589, 1604 (1996) (invalidating
punitive tort remedy). Although many of these efforts involve attempts to abolish or restrict punitive
damages, some of the proposals that have already been enacted limit or restrict a plaintiff's ability to
recover for actual damages (e.g., pain and suffering). See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial
Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposalfor the ComparativeAdditur/Remittur Review of
Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1121-27, 1191-93
(1995); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1587-90 (1987). Indiana's "reform" of medical malpractice liability provides a telling example. Under
current Indiana law, a plaintiff cannot recover more than $750,000 for a medical malpractice claim,
regardless of the actual damages incurred. See IND. CODE § 27-12-14-3(a); see also Johnson v. St.
Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 598-601 (Ind. 1980) (rejecting state and federal due process and equal
protection challenges to Indiana's statutory cap on medical malpractice compensatory damages).
Consistent with Truax, this Indiana law should be subject to constitutional attack as an abridgment of a
fundamental property interest, and-absent a compelling state interest-it should fall.
345. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 284-85 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reaffirming that
the common law, state law, and Constitution protect citizens and their rights). But see Johnson, 404
N.E.2d at 598-601 (holding that limiting damages for medical malpractice claims violates neither due
process nor equal protection).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 232-74.
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one's reputation is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition ' 34 7 and
is implicit in the concept of ordered property. 348 Alternatively, one could
describe the right to one's reputation as "basic in our system of jurispru35 0
dence", 349 and necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered property.
Thus, if a state failed to adequately protect a citizen's interest in her reputation, any law limiting a plaintiff's ability to recover actual compensatory
damages should be subject to constitutional attack on substantive due process
grounds. Suppose that a state legislature, enamored of the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, restricted all tort recoveries against the press for defamation to cases in which the plaintiff could
demonstrate actual malice. The subject matter and the plaintiff's status as a
public or private figure would be irrelevant to the plaintiff's burden of proof; all
plaintiffs bringing libel actions would be required to establish actual malice
(that is, knowledge of falsity prior to publication or reckless indifference to
truth or falsity).3
Once again, a fundamental property interest is at stake. The right to one's
reputation has deep roots in the common law, stretching back to the colonial
period.3 52 To this day, numerous state constitutions specifically protect the right
to one's reputation among other fundamental property and liberty interests.35 3
Accordingly, any state law that precluded recovery for damage to reputation
should be subjected to strict scrutiny and sustained only upon the state's
demonstration of a compelling need for such revision of its libel laws.35 4
As it happens, most states already adequately protect fundamental property
rights,355 so that recognition of such rights would not work a revolution in the
347. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
348. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
349. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
350. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
351. Cf Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1979) (rejecting argument
that any person engaged in criminal conduct is public figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. I11,
136 (1979) (holding actual malice standard inapplicable because the plaintiff was not public figure);
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (holding that litigant need not forfeit protection of
defamation law simply by virtue of status as litigant).
352. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
354. I am suggesting that the First Amendment right to a free press is the immediate neighbor of a
fundamental property right in one's reputation. All that this means is that the states cannot liberalize
their defamation law beyond the point compelled by New York limes Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny.
The same sort of border exists between the right to a fair trial and the freedom of the press. See
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir.
1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 976 (1991). The outer limits of each right are simply defined
in relation to the other right.
355. See generally Maureen Straub Kordesh, "I Will Build My House with Sticks": The Splintering
of Property Interests Under the Fifth Amendment May Be Hazardous to Private Property, 20 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 397, 418-22 (1996) (discussing various means by which state governments routinely
protect property interests). One reason may be a greater community consensus about the kinds of
property rights that should be protected. Everyone wants to own real property in fee simple absolute or
in an analogous kind of estate. Generally speaking, no racial, ethnic, or gender lines delineate the kinds
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law. Instead, the explicit recognition of substantive due process protection for
fundamental property rights would simply erect a bulwark against tort reform
proposals that go too far in restricting a plaintiff's ability to recover for certain
kinds of injuries.
At the federal level, however, the recognition of fundamental property rights
would cast doubt on the continuing validity of a number of precedents. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that mid-level government employees
have absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 for defamatory statements about
their underlings. 356 This blanket immunity flows solely from the federal judiciary's inherent power to create federal common law. 35 7 If reputation constitutes a
fundamental property interest, this official immunity would be inconsistent with
the employee's interest in reputation.35 8 At most, the government might be able
to demonstrate a compelling interest that justifies a qualified form of immunity.
However, recognition of fundamental property rights would generally not
unravel the existing fabric of constitutional law. Instead, it would simply restore
doctrinal symmetry to the Supreme Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence. If
fundamental liberty interests enjoy heightened protection under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, fundamental property interests should enjoy similar protection.
B. DEMONSTRATING THE LIMITS OF A FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE: A TALE OF COUNTESS LONA

Explicit recognition of the existence of fundamental property rights would
not undercut the substantial discretion states enjoy in establishing and policing
the parameters of nonfundamental property rights. Both state governments and
the federal government could continue to recognize or decline to recognize
particular property rights.
Even during the Lochner era, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged
that the state's traditional police powers included substantial discretion to define
of property interests that members of different subgroups of the community wish to see protected.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that a state legislature or state court will act to undermine fundamental
property rights; such action is likely to be wildly unpopular. Conversely, legislative, judicial, or
executive actions that deny the fundamental rights of unpopular minorities are far less likely to rouse
either the community's attention or its anger. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. t, 12 (1967)
(requiring that freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954) (concluding that "separate but equal" doctrine has no
place in the field of public education); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 111 (M.D. Ala. 1965)
(enjoining governor and agents from interfering with and failing to provide protection for plaintiffs'
peaceful assembly and march). Although fundamental property rights are generally more secure than
fundamental liberty rights, this is not an argument against the recognition of fundamental property
rights. Public choice theory suggests that well-organized interest groups will attempt to secure
self-serving legislation at every possible turn. Tort reform projects provide an example of such
behavior. Indeed, from time to time, such efforts prove fruitful. In such instances, the existence of a
fundamental property rights doctrine would be immediately useful and necessary.
356. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-76 (1959).
357. See id. at 586-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
358. See id. at 578-86 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Christie, supra note 289, at 60-63.
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and delimit particular property rights. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton
Railroad CO. 3 5 9 provides an excellent example of this phenomenon.
Sentell was the proud owner of a prize "Newfoundland bitch, known as
'Countess Lona.' ,,360 The dog died after being struck by a streetcar and Sentell
subsequently sued the railroad company-the owner of the streetcar-seeking
damages for the loss of his valuable pet.3 6

Louisiana law provided that "no dog shall be entitled to the protection of the
362
law unless the same shall have been placed upon the assessment rolls.",
Sentell had not registered Countess Lona but still wished to obtain a full
recovery against the railroad.
The Louisiana state trial court held that the state law limiting Sentell's
property interest in Countess Lona violated the Due Process Clause contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment.36 3 Following a trial on the merits, a jury returned a
verdict for $250, which the railroad company appealed. 364 The Louisiana state
appellate court reversed, holding that Sentell's failure to comply with the state
law requiring registration and payment of the tax barred him from recovery.36 5
Sentell appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking reversal of the state court's
holding that he lacked a property interest in Countess Lona absent compliance
with the statute.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Sentell's claim. Writing for the
Court, Justice Brown observed that "[i]n Louisiana there is only a conditional
property in dogs."' 3 6 6 Only after a dog is registered with the state and property
tax is paid may the owner recover damages for injury or the death of the
367
animal-and then in an amount not exceeding the assessed value of the beast.
Although the Court suggested that this scheme might be unconstitutional "if

359. 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 700.
362. 1882 La. Acts 107, § 2. State law also limited civil recoveries for the loss of a dog to "the
amount of the value of such dog or dogs, as fixed by [the owner] in the last assessment preceding the
killing or injuries complained of." Id. § 3.
363. Sentell, 166 U.S. at 699.
364. Id. Plainly, Countess Lona was a valuable dog indeed.
365. Id. at 700.
366. Id. at 706. Justice Brown's observation about the nature of dogs-and the concomitant need for
"drastic" regulation of the ownership of the beasts-bears recounting:
Although dogs are ordinarily harmless, they preserve some of their hereditary wolfish
instincts, which occasionally break forth in the destruction of sheep and other helpless
animals. Others, too small to attack these animals, are simply vicious, noisy and pestilent. As
their depredations are often committed at night, it is usually impossible to identify the dog or
fix the liability upon the owner, who, moreover, is likely to be pecuniarily irresponsible. In
short, the damages are usually such as are beyond the reach of judicial process, and
legislation of a drastic nature is necessary to protect persons and property from destruction
and annoyance. Such legislation is clearly within the police power of the State.
Id. at 705-06. It seems unlikely that Justice Brown owned a dog.
367. Id. at 706.
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[the
applied to domestic animals generally,"' 368 it held that "there is nothing ' in
369
regulations] of which the owner of a dog has any legal right to complain.
At the height of the Lochner era, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Sentell by
upholding a New York statute that required dog owners within the state to pay
an annual two-dollar licensing fee as a precondition to claiming a protected
property interest in a dog. 370 Nicchia, the petitioner, argued that conditioning
the recognition of a property interest in her pet on the two-dollar payment
denied her due process of law. 37 ' The Supreme Court breezily rejected this
argument, relying principally on Sentell: "Property in dogs is of an imperfect or
qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police
372
regulations by the State without depriving their owners of any federal right.'
Although the Nicchia Court would strike down Arizona's anti-injunction statute
the facts of Nicchia, to recognize
in Truax one year later, they declined, under
37 3
an unqualified right to property in pooches.
Ten years later, the Supreme Court held that postdeprivation remedies were
adequate to redress the wrongful seizure of property in tax cases.3 74 Writing for
a unanimous court, Justice Brandeis explained that "[wihere only property
rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of
due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of
the liability is adequate." ' 375 Thus, the Internal Revenue Service could seize
property to satisfy tax liabilities free of substantive due process challenges.
where
"Delay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon
376
it is essential that governmental needs be immediately satisfied.",
These cases illustrate that even the Lochner Court did not deem all property
rights equal. Like "fundamental" liberty rights, "fundamental" property rights
enjoyed special protection; under Truax, legislatures did not enjoy plenary authority to
revise property laws, at least insofar as the revisions touched upon "fundamental"
property interests. At the same time, Sentell and Nicchia established that at least
368. Id. It is unclear what other "domestic animals" the Court had in mind.
369. Id. Simply put, "[i]t is purely within the discretion of the legislature to say how far dogs shall
be recognized as property, and under what restrictions they shall be permitted to roam the streets." Id.
Adding insult to injury, the Court suggested that, if anything, Louisiana dog owners should be grateful
for the statute, because it "really puts a premium upon valuable dogs, by giving them a recognized
position, and by permitting the owner to put his own estimate upon them." Id.
370. See Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920) (McReynolds, J.).
371. Id. at 230.
372. Id.
373. Cf. Scharfeld v. Richardson, 133 F.2d 340, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ("It is an established principle
of the common law that a dog is personal property and that its owner may recover for a willful or
negligent injury thereto, and it has been deemed immaterial whether the injured dog had been licensed
or taxed as prescribed by law." (footnote omitted)). Judge-soon to be Justice-Vinson seemed
decidedly more sympathetic to the plight of dog owners than Justices Brown and McReynolds.
However, Judge Vinson also recognized that "[i]t is in the discretion of the legislature ... to delimit
these property rights in a dog." Id. (footnote omitted).
374. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931).
375. Id. at 596-97.
376. Id.
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with respect to some property interests, the state enjoyed broad discretion to
adopt "peculiar and drastic" laws limiting nonfundamental property rights.
This distinction is sound; not all property rights merit full substantive due
process protection.37 7 The government should enjoy a relatively free hand when
limiting nonfundamental property rights; moreover, this freedom should encompass the right occasionally to make erroneous decisions.37 8 When government
actions that destroy or diminish a nonfundamental property interest are utterly
arbitrary, however, judicial review should lie, and Sentell and Nicchia do not
hold to the contrary.
IV.

TOWARD ADOPTING A THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

The federal courts must not shrink from overseeing the content of state
379
statutory and common law to ensure vindication of federal constitutional rights.
To be sure, such review threatens cherished principles of federalism and should
therefore not be undertaken lightly. Even if one gives federalism its due,
however, the federal courts will occasionally still find it constitutionally necessary to intervene in state substantive law. The question is not whether federal
courts should police state substantive law, but rather how they should do it.
Recent case law suggests that substantive due process requires the federal courts
to play a more active role in circumscribing the substantive content of state law.
A. ALBRIGHT V. OLIVER AND THE EXTENSION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Albright v. Oliver is the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the
general scope of substantive due process. In Albright, an arrestee claimed that
the state unlawfully deprived him of a liberty interest by initiating a criminal

377. In this regard, one must distinguish between "rationality" and "fundamental rights" substantive due process review. Substantive due process provides a means of reviewing the basic rationality of
any federal or state law that impinges on a cognizable liberty or property interest. See generally Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). This review is not contingent on the "fundamental" nature of the right at issue. See, e.g.,
Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407-10 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding due
process review applicable where any government action is arbitrary and capricious), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Of
course, a state need only proffer a rational basis to turn the challenge back. See id. at 1409. On the other
hand, "fundamental rights" substantive due process review mandates probing judicial review, in which
the state must establish a compelling interest in maintaining the law at issue. See Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
378. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976); see also Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529,
537 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Bishop and holding that absent a fundamental interest, government actions
that burden either property or liberty interests need only be rational).
379. See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996) (striking down a "grossly excessive"
punitive damages award); see also Fallon, supra note 91, at 328-29 (arguing for federal court oversight
of state substantive laws when necessary to protect federal constitutional fights); Van Alstyne, supra
note 18, at 458 n.43, 473 n.84 (arguing that federal courts cannot constitutionally avoid determining the
meaning of "liberty" and "property" independent of state substantive law if federal constitutional
rights related to liberty and property are to have any substantive effect).
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prosecution against him in the absence of probable cause.3 8 ° Instead of basing
his claim on the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement, Albright
due
claimed only that "the action of respondents infringed his 3substantive
81
cause."
probable
without
prosecution
of
free
process right to be
Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Albright could not
use the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause to avoid adverse interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. 382 "As a general matter, the Court has always
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce
and open-ended." 3 83 Accordingly, "[tihe protections of substantive due process
have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family,
procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.", 384 Although the plurality declined
to apply heightened scrutiny to the state's behavior, or to create substantive
standards limiting the state's ability to bring criminal charges against individual
citizens,3 85 the case led to a plethora of concurring and dissenting opinions: six
Justices wrote separately, and seven of the nine Justices joined some or all of
Kennedy's concurring opinion is easily the
these individual opinions. Justice
386
most intriguing of the group.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that although Albright did
not state a valid substantive due process claim, such claims could exist, even if

380. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 269 (1994) (plurality opinion).
381. Id. at 271 (plurality opinion).
382. Id. at 271-75 (plurality opinion).
383. Id. at 271-72 (plurality opinion) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)).
384. Id. (plurality opinion). Strictly speaking, this is not entirely true. As a theoretical matter,
substantive due process protects any cognizable liberty or property interest. However, in the postLochner era, federal courts apply a very deferential rationality test to determine whether a state or
federal law violates substantive due process. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 n.9 (1982); Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 969 (11th Cir. 1986); see
also Phillips, supra note 35, at 283-85, 289 (noting that "a means-ends test is still applied in due
process challenges to the substance of economic regulation"). What the Chief Justice no doubt meant is
that the Court has historically reserved heightened scrutiny of substantive due process claims to a very
small class of cases.
385. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-75 (plurality opinion).
386. The other concurring opinions merit brief mention. Justice Scalia wrote to emphasize that in his
view, substantive due process protects only those rights "incorporated" against the states from the Bill
of Rights. Id. at 275-76 (Scalia, J., concurring). According to Justice Scalia, the Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence does not permit it to create new constitutional protections for criminal defendants
over and above the specific textual guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Id. (Scalia,
J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg concurred separately to explain that she preferred to analyze the case
through the prism of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 276-81 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Souter
penned a concurrence sounding a similar theme: when the Constitution contains a clause addressing a
particular substantive right, that clause-not the Due Process Clause-should govern the Court's
analysis. Id. at 286-91 (Souter, J., concurring). For Justice Souter, like Justice Ginsburg, the Fourth
Amendment provided the relevant decisional framework for Albright's claim of malicious prosecution.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring). However, unlike Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter expressly noted that the
Court could, in appropriate circumstances, recognize substantive due process rights that are coextensive
with other constitutional rights. Id. at 288-91 (Souter, J., concurring).
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they were coextensive with the procedural guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. 387 "The common law of torts long recognized that a malicious prosecution, like a defamatory statement, can cause unjustified torment and anguishboth by tarnishing one's name and by costing the accused money in legal fees
and the like.", 388 Kennedy reasoned that "some of the interests granted historical protection by the common law of torts (such as the interests in freedom from
defamation and malicious prosecution) are protected by [the substantive aspects
389
of] the Due Process Clause.",
Justice Kennedy joined in the plurality's result because, in his view, Parrattv.
Taylor excused the state from any direct responsibility for the wrong at issue.
Because state law did not sanction the prosecutor's actions, Parrattprecluded a
§ 1983 action for a violation of substantive due process. Indeed, Kennedy
decried the invocation of substantive due process claims to avoid Parratt'sbite:
The Parratt rule has been avoided by attaching a substantive rather than
procedural label to due process claims (a distinction that if accepted in this
context could render Parratta dead letter) and by treating claims based on the
Due Process Clause as claims based on some other constitutional provision. 390

For Justices Kennedy and Thomas, Parrattalone governed Albright's claim.
However, Justice Kennedy went on to explain that "if a State did not provide
a tort remedy for malicious prosecution, there would be force to the argument
that the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution infringes an
interest protected by the Due Process Clause and enforceable under § 1983. ' ' 3 9
Given the existence of an adequate state tort remedy, "[w]e need not conduct
392
that inquiry in this case.",
In this single paragraph, Justices Kennedy and Thomas essentially reject the
fundamental principle of Paul v. Davis, which held that § 1983 could not be
read to make the Fourteenth Amendment a "font of tort law to be superimposed
upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.", 39 3 Under
Paul, § 1983 does not "expropio vigore extend to [a would-be § 1983 plaintiff]
a ight to be free of injury wherever the State may be characterized as the
tortfeasor.", 394 Justices Kennedy and Thomas reject this reasoning, at least as
applied to a substantive due process claim. 395 Rather, in their view, states have
387. Id. at 281-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
388. Id. at 283 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
389. Id. at 283-84 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
390. Id. at 285 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
391. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
392. Id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
393. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
394. Id.
395. Paul involved a claim of procedural, rather than substantive, due process. Id. at 697. The Paul
Court did not decide whether Davis might have been able to claim a violation of substantive due
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an obligation to afford some protection to "interests granted historical protection by the common law of torts."' 3 9 6 This reasoning is entirely consistent with
the Court's earlier decision in Truax, which required Arizona to afford legal
protection to certain "fundamental" property rights.39 7 Under this view, the
states do not possess plenary power to redefine the protection afforded certain
fundamental property and liberty interests under the common law. Justice
Kennedy's apparent willingness to police the substantive content of state tort
law through the use of substantive due process reflects nothing less than a
repudiation of Paul's federalism-based policy underpinnings.
Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens argued that substantive due process
protections may be invoked when a state actor violates an interest protected by a
long-standing common law tort principles.39 s In a dissent joined by Justice
Blackmun, Justice Stevens opined that substantive due process should reach
claims of malicious prosecution. 399 He noted that
[g]iven the abundance of precedent in the Courts of Appeals, the vintage of
the liberty interest at stake, and the fact that the Fifth Amendment categorically forbids the Federal Government from initiating a felony prosecution
without presentment to a grand jury, it is quite wrong to characterize petitioner's claim as an invitation to enter unchartered territory. On the contrary, the
claim is manifestly of constitutional dimension. 4°
Justice Stevens directly responded to Justice Kennedy's assertion that Parratt
controlled the resolution of Albright's claim: "The remedy for a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provided by § 1983 is not limited,
as Justice Kennedy posits ... to cases in which the injury has been caused by 'a
state law, policy, or procedure.' ,,401 Instead, "[sjection 1983 provides a federal
cause of action against '[e]very person' who under color of state authority
causes the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.' ,,402 Because Albright's claim raised a liberty interest,
entitled to predeprivation process as a
rather than a property interest, he 40was
3
matter of federal constitutional law.

process. Cf Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-35 (1991) (refusing to recognize or create a
Bivens--constitutional tort-action for injury to reputation).
396. Albright, 510 U.S. at 283 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
397. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921).
398. Albright, 510 U.S. at 313-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
399. Id. at 291-316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
400. Id. at 311 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
401. Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
402. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 313-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens has long maintained that property
interests need only be protected by adequate postdeprivation process. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 701 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is unclear why this should be so, particularly if the property
right at issue is "fundamental." See supra notes 182-210 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens did
not participate in deciding Paul v. Davis, so it is difficult to gauge whether his opinion depends on the
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In short, five Justices appear to believe that substantive due process can
provide a basis for reviewing the adequacy of state law relief for torts. Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, Stevens, Blackmun, and Souter all stated that the substantive
aspect of the Due Process Clause could, under appropriate circumstances,
serve
n n
as the basis for imposing tort-like liability on a state officer or agency. 0
Unfortunately, the opinions provide little guidance as to when substantive due
process should protect individual citizens from tort-like injuries at the hand of
the state. Justice Kennedy's reliance on the common law suggests that tradition
should serve as the touchstone of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence. Justice Stevens's dissent also places great reliance on the "vintage of the
liberty interest at stake.", 40 5 Thus, it seems plain that at least four of the Justices
view historical or traditional recognition of the interest as a prerequisite to
substantive due process protection.
The fractured reasoning in Albright makes it difficult to predict how the Court
would react if squarely presented with a claim that a state law effectively
abridged a right historically protected under the common law. However, the
concurring and dissenting opinions of several Justices-particularly Justice
Kennedy's concurrence-suggest both an openness to considering such a claim
on the merits and reason for optimism regarding the probable result.
B. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

In the context of substantive due process liberty claims, Justice John Marshall
Harlan cautioned that "[e]ach new claim to Constitutional protection must be
considered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been
rationally perceived and historically developed.", 40 6 The principal difficulty
with the approaches to substantive due process property claims taken by most of
the courts of appeals is that such approaches fail to properly address the importance of
the threshold question whether a particular property right is "fundamental."
A hypothetical will demonstrate the problem and its potential resolution.
Suppose that I smoke in the Supreme Court cafeteria, in derogation of an
express policy forbidding such activity. Suppose further that a federal marshal,
noting the acrid smell of nicotine and burning tobacco leaves, issues an appropriate citation, fining me $250 for my failure to observe the no-smoking policy.
Having gone to law school, and suffering from a litigious bent, I decide to fight
the citation. In my defense, I claim that I was denied a liberty interest-the right
to smoke at a time and place of my own choosing-without constitutionally sufficient
process. Moreover, I would argue that whatever process that the government deigned
to afford persons like myself could never be sufficient, because the government
simply cannot restrict smoking in public cafeterias in public buildings.
nature of the property right at issue. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 714 (1976).
404. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 383-85 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 286-91 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 313-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
405. Id. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
406. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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A federal district judge would not be vexed for long before disposing of my
pleading. With respect to the first claim, she would no doubt consider carefully
any particularized claims that I wished to raise regarding the sufficiency of the
process incident to the issuance of the citation, including whether the officer
observed me smoking, whether the officer provided me with notice of the
infraction, and whether the statute confers an opportunity to challenge the
citation at a formal hearing presided over by a neutral decisionmaker. All of
these issues sound in "procedural" due process and address the fundamental
fairness of the government's course of conduct. These issues do not challenge
the government's power or authority to engage in the course of conduct; they
presume the underlying validity of the prohibition on smoking in the cafeteria.
Depending on the facts surrounding the issuance of my citation
and the
procedural protections conferred by the statute or regulation, my procedural due
process claim may or may not succeed. In any event, the presiding judge would
probably have to consider my procedural due process arguments on the merits.
My claim to substantive due process protection is another matter entirely.
Although I have identified an interest sounding in "liberty," no court would
seriously entertain the claim that individuals have a right to smoke where and
when they please. In order to make out a viable claim to "substantive" due
process protection, I must establish either that the liberty interest at issue is
"fundamental," thereby triggering heightened scrutiny review, 40 7 or that the
government's behavior was utterly arbitrary, therefore triggering rationality
review. 408 A merely pedestrian liberty interest will not suffice; if the interest is
40 9 the reviewing
not deeply embedded in our traditions of individual autonomy,
410
court will not labor long before dismissing my claim.
Returning to the appellate cases described earlier in Part Ic, one finds that
none of them involves a property interest that plainly qualifies as "fundamental." Instead, the cases generally present a menagerie of disgruntled civil
servants who feel that the state has wrongfully deprived them of a job or
promotion.a4''
That many lower federal courts have struggled to explain why substantive
407. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 194 (1986); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
408. See Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994).
409. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
410. Arguably, the Supreme Court has never completely repudiated substantive due process review
of economic regulations. Instead, the Court applies an exceedingly deferential standard of review. See
Phillips, supra note 34, at 283-85, 289; see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-38 (1981)
(recognizing that economic substantive due process review still exists, but noting that the Court applies
a rational basis standard of review to such claims); Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25
(1978) (same).
411. See, e.g., Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 1995); McKinney v. Pate,
20 F.3d 1550, 1554 (lth Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995); Charles v. Baesler,
910 F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (6th Cir. 1990); Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 240-41 (3d Cir. 1989); Schaper
v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1987).
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due process does not provide an avenue of relief in such cases is somewhat
puzzling. Because the property interests at issue were far from "fundamental,"
the courts should have rejected the claim to substantive due process protection
4 12
out of hand, absent a showing of wholly irrational governmental conduct.
Once again, Justice Powell's concurrence in Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing 4 13 lights the path. Unless a particular property interest is on
par with the right to vote, the right to choose whether to beget a child, the right
to marry a person of one's choosing, or the right to decide whether to seek
medical treatment, the substantive due process analysis should be rather short.4 14
This is not to say that no property interest could qualify for strict scrutiny
substantive due process protection. To foreclose a category of fundamental
property rights because many claims are frivolous begs the question of a court's
obligation in that rare case when the claim is not frivolous. The federal courts
should not foreclose the possibility of protecting other, sufficiently weighty
liberty interests such as suffrage, procreation, and medical treatment simply
because someone would argue that smoking in public buildings is a fundamental liberty interest. Nevertheless, some of the courts of appeals have used
language that seems to foreclose the existence of any fundamental property
rights simply because the case before them did not raise a serious claim.41 5
412. In the words of Justice Harlan, substantive due process encompasses "freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgment." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (citations omitted)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see Fallon, supra note 91, at 314-15, 356-60, 363-64; Phillips, supra note 34, at
267.
413. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
414. Indeed, a simple one-paragraph order would have sufficed in most of the lower federal court
cases decided to date:
Substantive due process protects only those rights, whether characterized as "liberty" or
"property," that may reasonably be deemed "fundamental" in a free society. That is to say, a
right must be "deeply embedded in our Anglo-American law," or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty [or property]." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Appellant
claims that "x" is such a property right. With respect, we must disagree. Absent a longstanding tradition of affording "x" particular solicitude, the strict scrutiny component of
substantive due process simply does not apply. Because no plausible argument can be made
that "x" comes within the limited class of "fundamental" property interests, we must reject
appellant's claim. Substantive due process also protects citizens from utterly irrational and
arbitrary government action affecting nonfundamental liberty and property interests. Although we cannot say that government's behavior was without blame or fault, it was not
completely devoid of reason. AFFIRMED.
Cf DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 599-601 (3d Cir.) (holding that any ownership
interest is sufficiently "fundamental" to trigger full substantive due process protection, but applying
only rational basis review), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
415. Another reason for refusing to accord property interests substantive due process protection
stems from a concern that such a holding would effectively overrule Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981), Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Plainly,
this concern is unjustified. Parratt,Daniels, and Hudson are proceduraldue process cases; they involve
attempts by the state officials to deny property without adequate predeprivation process, in contravention of applicable state laws or policies. Moreover, none of these cases involves fundamental rights. See
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There remains, of course, the objection that federal courts have no business
supervising state substantive law, and that explicit recognition of fundamental
property rights would necessarily entail a tremendous expansion of federal court
review of state laws. This objection is not without force; however, it presumes a
state of affairs that no longer exists. Vast areas of state substantive law have
already been constitutionalized.41 6
The federal courts already supervise the definitions of "property" for purposes of applying the substantive guarantees of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 41 7 The federal courts cannot escape policing state-created definitions of
property if either the Fourth Amendment or the Takings Clause is to have any
substance. 4 18 Incorporating (or, more accurately, re-incorporating) a doctrine of
fundamental property rights would simply expand the scope of the federal
judiciary's superintendence of state substantive property, contract, and tort law.
Moreover, if the Supreme Court's recent decision in BMW v. Gore4 19 provides any guidance, a majority of the Court appears untroubled by the prospect
of overseeing state substantive law on a massive scale. 4 20 Dr. Ira Gore pur-

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 329, 331-32 (holding that Due Process Clause was not implicated by negligence of
state prison officials in slip and fall accident); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520-22, 530-33 (holding that Due
Process Clause was not implicated when prison officials intentionally destroyed inmate's property);
Parratt,451 U.S. at 530-31, 537-44 (holding that Due Process Clause was not implicated when prison
officials negligently lost inmate's property); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990)
(applying Parrattand Daniels to deprivation of liberty interest). They do not speak to a state's ability to
define the property interest in the first place or to state officials' ability to burden sufficiently important
property interests. Therefore, recognizing that the state bears a special burden of care when select
property interests are at stake would not affect the continuing validity of Parratt,Daniels, or Hudson.
Indeed, the relevant inquiry is whether the Supreme Court would itself follow these decisions if a
fundamental right were at issue. For example, if a prison warden knew that a guard routinely beat
prisoners with a rubber hose, the state's failure to act would constitute a deprivation of a fundamental
interest, even if the warden and the guard were acting outside the scope of their delegated authority. See
Estelle v. Gambel, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Robinson v
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910); see also Van
Alstyne, supra note 18, at 482 (arguing that substantive due process should protect fundamental
property rights). These facts take the case beyond the realm of procedural due process, which presumes
the validity of the state's policy, and into the realm of substantive due process, which establishes firm
boundaries that the state cannot cross, whether deliberately or on an ad hoc basis.
416. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-50 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); cf. Elaine W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes
of Constitutionalizing State Common Law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 173, 183-86 (arguing that
constitutionalizing state tort law would be unwise because of federalism concerns).
417. See Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 458 & n.43, 473 n.84.
418. See Fallon, supra note 91, at 328-29, 353-55, 358-60, 363-64.
419. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
420. See id. at 1595-98. Indeed, given the breadth of the Court's holding, coupled with the paucity of
guidance to the lower federal courts, it is certain that the federal judiciary will be spending a great deal
of time establishing the parameters of the newly constitutionalized law of punitive damages. Cf
Shoben, supra note 415, at 173-77, 186-87 (arguing that constitutionalization of state tort law will be
both time-consuming and ultimately unsatisfactory). Furthermore, as Justice Ginsburg has observed,
many (if not most) of the decisions will come into the federal system directly at the Supreme Court
level via direct review of state supreme court decisions. See Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J.,
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chased a "new" BMW sports sedan that the manufacturer had repainted.
However, BMW failed to inform Gore that his automobile's paint job had been
damaged and repaired prior to delivery of his new vehicle. 4 2' A jury awarded
Gore $2 million in punitive damages, and BMW appealed. 42 2 The Supreme
Court began its analysis of the case by reiterating its prior holding that a grossly
excessive punitive damages award violates a substantive due process interest in
property.4 23 After considering the degree of BMW's culpability, the disparity
between the harm that BMW inflicted on Gore and the amount of the punitive
damages award, and the lack of similar punitive damages awards in comparable
cases, the Court concluded that the punitive damages judgment was "grossly exces424
sive" and, accordingly, struck down the award on substantive due process grounds.

BMW v. Gore demonstrates the viability of substantive due process as a check
on arbitrary or irrational government actions or laws.4 25 However, the Court
needs to close the circle by making explicit that which is only implicit in its
punitive damages award cases: property rights, like liberty rights, enjoy substantive due process protection.
Gore, Albright, and other cases like them demonstrate conclusively that it is
far too late in the day to protest the federal courts' oversight of vast areas of
state*substantive law. Indeed, one could argue that the objection has been moot
since Marbury v. Madison4 26 and Martin v. Hunter'sLessee.42 7

Finally, one might argue that providing substantive due process protection for
nonfundamental property rights would "trivialize" the Constitution.42 8 This

dissenting); cf id. at 1604 n.41 (Stevens, J.) (arguing that concerns regarding the scope of the
undertaking "surely do[] not justify an abdication of our responsibility to enforce constitutional
protections in an extraordinary case such as this one").
421. Id.at 1593.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1595-98; see also id. at 1604 (Breyer, J., concurring); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-58 (1993) (holding that damage award was not so "grossly
excessive" as to violate due process); id. at 470-71 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that due process
requires review of damage award only for reasonableness).
424. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1592-98.
425. Id. at 1595-98; TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 453-58; id. at 470-71 (Scalia, J., concurring);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991).
426. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
427. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also Fallon, supra note 91, at 353-54, 358-60 (arguing that
federal courts have historically relied on state tort law to indicate substantive due process rights); Van
Alstyne, supra note 18, at 458 n.43 (arguing that the definition of "property" has always been a federal
question under the Fourteenth Amendment).
428. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 545 (1981)
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 548-49, 554 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Rodney A. Smolla,
The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 840-47 (noting that "[t]he critics of Paul v.
Davis have never fully explained satisfactorily how a section 1983 action is in any substantive law
sense an improvement on the law of libel" and concluding that the result in Paul was "sound" because
state law adequately protected Davis's interest in his reputation); cf Roberta M. Kania, Note, A Theory
of Negligence for ConstitutionalTorts, 92 YALE L.J. 683, 705 n.78 (1983) (arguing that "[ilt does not
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concern is misplaced, so long as one is committed to the notion that the Constitution
requires agents of the govermment to act with at least minimum rationality.
Writing in the context of procedural due process, Professor William Van
Alstyne has suggested that substantive due process ought to protect citizens
from "procedural grossness.", 429 Noting that "[t]he idea of freedom from
adjudicative procedural arbitrariness as an element of personal liberty does not
lack text, logic, flexibility, or precedent,""430 he argues that the Due Process
Clause should be applied to protect due process itself.43 ' This idea that due
process should guarantee at least a modicum of protection from arbitrary or
irrational government behavior harkens back to Justice Harlan's famous dissent
in Poe v. Ullman,43 2 in which he posited4 33that the requirements of the Due
Process Clause exist along "a continuum.""
All of this leads to the conclusion that the abstention doctrine espoused in
Parrattshould not preclude suits that seek to establish the wholly arbitrary or
irrational nature of particular government behavior. Arbitrary or irrational conduct by government officers constitutes a substantive constitutional wrong,
regardless of the adequacy or inadequacy of the procedures surrounding the
action."3"
Of course, irrespective of whether a plaintiff claims that the government has
violated his equal protection or substantive due process rights, 35 the government's action should enjoy a strong presumption of legitimacy in the absence of
a fundamental interest. 4 3 6 The policy reasons that support this result in the
context of the Equal Protection Clause apply with full force in the context of
substantive due process: in the absence of an invidious classification or a
fundamental interest, it is unreasonable to place a high burden on the government to justify its actions. 43 7 Applying strict scrutiny to all allegations of unfair

trivialize the constitutional damage action to bring a case to trial where the government's conduct is on
its face wrongful").
429. See Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 487-90; see also Fallon, supra note 91, at 310, 314-17,
358-60, 363-64.
430. Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 488.
431. Id. at 487-88; see also Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in ConstitutionalLaw: Judicial
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1049 (1979) (discussing the value of the rationality
requirement in due process analysis).
432. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
433. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
434. See Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407-12 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc); see also Fallon, supra note 91, at 358-60 (arguing that the Due Process Clause is implicated
when government officials act arbitrarily).
435. Professor Henry Monaghan has argued that the provisions have become increasingly interchangeable. See Monaghan, supra note 289, at 406.
436. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984); see also Fallon,
supra note 91, at 358-60, 363-64.
437. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-33 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
152 (1955); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934); cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding zoning ordinance invalid under Equal Protection Clause).

144,
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or arbitrary government action would require the federal courts to micromanage
the day-to-day operation of government at the local, state, and federal levels.
Aside from the federal courts' inability to shoulder such a herculean task, it is
doubtful that they possess the constitutional authority to undertake such an
experiment.
Viewed in this light, the courts that have permitted substantive due process
claims grounded in nonfundamental property rights have properly recognized
that substantive due process provides a modest check on utterly arbitrary
government action. As noted earlier, several federal appellate courts have
recognized substantive due process claims for nonfundamental property interests and have applied a very deferential standard of review when engaged in
substantive due process analyses of nonfundamental rights. 438 Their recognition
of this class of claims makes doctrinal sense.
Those courts that have declined to recognize substantive due process claims
for nonfundamental property rights (outside the context of zoning decisions)
have missed the mark. A plaintiff should be permitted to raise a substantive due
process challenge to virtually any government action.4 39 That such substantive
due process claims should routinely fail, just as equal protection claims based
on noninvidious distinctions usually fail, is no excuse for refusing to give
judicial cognizance to an important subclass of federal constitutional claims. 440
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court must reestablish symmetry between property and liberty
in its substantive due process jurisprudence. It has already done so in the
context of procedural due process, and the Court's failure to recognize the
existence of fundamental property rights has created an illogical asymmetry in
its fundamental rights discourse. Federal courts should permit plaintiffs to bring
substantive due process property claims as a means of seeking review of
virtually any government action; however, only a limited subclass of such
claims-those involving fundamental rights-should merit close or probing
judicial scrutiny. Such an approach, which incorporates and applies Justice
Harlan's notion of substantive due process as something of a continuum, would
avoid the pitfalls associated with either applying strict scrutiny to all substantive
due process property claims or refusing to recognize such claims at all.
438. Sinaloa, 882 F.2d at 1409; Moore v. Warwick Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.
1986).
439. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215-23 (6th Cir. 1992).
440. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights created in the first 10 amendments); Pearson, 961 F.2d at
1215-23 (finding no substantive due process violation in denial of rezoning request); see also Fallon,
supra note 91, at 358-60 (arguing that federal courts must oversee state law under substantive due
process standards); Henkin, supra note 61, at 491 n.39 (arguing that states may be required to protect
liberty and property interests); Phillips, supra note 34, at 283-85 (arguing that substantive due process
has not been repudiated in the post-Lochner era); Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 485-90 (arguing that
freedom from "adjudicative procedural arbitrariness" is a component of substantive due process).

